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THE FUTURE AS HISTORY: The Prospects for
Global Convergence in Corporate Governance And Its Implications.

by John C. Coffee, Jr.*
What forces explain corporate structure and shareholder behavior? For
decades this question has gone unasked, as both corporate law scholars and
practitioners tacitly accepted the answer given in 1932 by Adolf Berle and Gardiner
Means that the separation of ownership and control stemming from ownership
fragmentation explained and assured shareholder passivity.1 Over this decade,
however, corporate law scholars have recognized that this standard answer begs an
essential prior question: if ownership fragmentation explains shareholder passivity,

*

Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law at Columbia University Law School.
The author wishes to acknowledge helpful comments and assistance
from his colleagues, Melvin A. Eisenberg, Ronald Gilson, Victor
Goldberg and Jeffrey Gordon, and also from Merritt Fox, as well as
from participants at law and economics seminars at the Universities of
Kansas and Michigan.

1

See Adolf A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, Jr., THE MODERN
CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). For the first
reconsiderations of this thesis, see Bernard Black, Shareholder
Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520 (1990); Alfred Conard,
Beyond Managerialism: Investor Capitalism?, 22 U. Mich. J. L. Ref.
117 (1988).
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what explains ownership fragmentation? Although the Berle and Means model
assumed that large scale enterprises could raise sufficient capital to conduct their
operations only by attracting a large number of equity investors, contemporary
empirical evidence finds that, even at the level of the largest firms, dispersed share
ownership is a localized phenomenon, largely limited to the United States and Great
Britain. Not only does the latest comparative research demonstrate that
concentrated (not dispersed) ownership is the dominant, world-wide pattern,2 but in2

For the fullest discussion of this point (and detailed evidence from the
27 principal corporate law jurisdictions), see Rafael LaPorta, Florenco
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Schleifer, Corporate Ownership Around
the World (May, 1998) (Draft manuscript available on the Web). This
study examines the ownership structure of the largest firms in 27
different countries (those with the 26 largest Gross National Products
and Mexico). Compiling data on the ten largest publicly traded nonfinancial companies in each country, they found that (i) slightly less
than forty percent qualified as widely held, (ii) thirty percent were
family controlled, (iii) eighteen percent were state controlled, and (iv)
the balance fell into different categories not involving dispersed
ownership. It should be underscored that this study focused only on
the very largest firms. Once the threshold is lowered, the extent of
concentrated ownership becomes even clearer. Estimates differ, but
the basic picture is the same across a variety of recent studies. Julian
Franks and Colin Mayer find that 85% of large German firms had a
shareholder with at least a 25% ownership interest. See J. Franks and
C. Mayer, Ownership, Control and the Performance of German
Corporations (Working Paper for a Sloan Conference at Columbia Law
School, April, 1997). Another recent study estimates that 64 percent of
large German firms have a majority owner, while in France the
corresponding figure is 59 percent. See Paul Windolf, The Governance
Structure of Large French Corporations: A Comparative Perspective, in
-2-

depth studies of individual countries show that shareholder activism increases in
direct proportion to ownership concentration.3 As a result, these findings, in turn,
suggest that the conventional governance norms in the United States may be more
the product of a path-dependent history than the “natural” result of an inevitable
evolution toward greater efficiency.
Propelling this new inquiry into whether the Berle/Means corporation--with
its famous “separation of ownership and control”--is the inevitable and efficient
endpoint of economic evolution, or only the artifact of political forces and historical

Columbia Law School, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TODAY 695,
714 (1998) [hereinafter, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TODAY].
Still one more recent study estimates that 75% of all German listed
companies have a majority owner, while another 23% have a
blockholder group holding in excess of ninety percent of the firm’s
equity capital. See Tim Jenkinson and Alexander Ljungquist, Hostile
Stakes and the Role of Banks in German Corporate Governance,
NBER Discussion Paper No. 1695 (October 1997). See also
discussion infra at note 13.
3

For recent commentary on the impact of ownership concentration on
shareholder behavior, see, e.g., Bernard Black and John Coffee, Hail
Britannia?: Institutional Invest or Behavior Under Limited Regulation,
92 Mich. L. Rev. 1997 (1994); John Coffee, Liquidity versus Control:
The Institutional Investor As Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev.
1277 (1991); Ronald Gilson and Mark Roe, Understanding the
Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and
Industrial Organization, 102 Yale L.J. 871 (1993), and Mark Roe,
Some Differences in Company Structure in Germany, Japan and the
United States, 102 Yale L.J. 1927 (1993).
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contingencies, is the unavoidable reality of increased global competition in both the
product and capital markets. As a result, dispersed and concentrated ownership
structures not only differ, but they may be forced to compete. Although scholars
have debated the relative merits of these rival models for a decade or more, this
prospect of an evolutionary competition--with its implication of a Darwinian
“survival of the fittest” struggle-- is very new. Ultimately, the issue thus posed is
which system will dominate (and why): the stock market centered system of
dispersed ownership first described by Berle and Means or the blockholder and
cross-shareholding systems that now prevail across Europe and Asia. Of course, a
clear winner does not necessarily have to emerge. The more one believes that
political forces are likely to constrain and override purely economic forces, the more
one is likely to expect a more muddled and contextual outcome. Thus, the current
debate has two levels that can often become confused: (1) Which system of
corporate governance is superior?, and (2) Which set of forces-- economic or
political-- are likely to prove more powerful?
To appreciate this distinction, it is useful to understand that the current debate
has progressed through several discrete stages. First, beginning earlier in this
decade, a provocative new wave of law and economic scholars advanced “political”
theories that explained the dispersed share ownership in large American
-4-

corporations as the product of political forces and historical contingencies, not
economic efficiency. 4 An undercurrent in this criticism was the theme that political
constraints had produced a suboptimal system of corporate governance, with
dispersed ownership implying inherently inadequate corporate monitoring. Some of
these scholars argued that the Anglo-American pattern of dispersed ownership was
clearly inferior to the bank-centered capital markets of Germany and Japan, because
the latter enabled corporate executives to manage for the long-run (while U.S.
managers were allegedly forced to maximize short-term earnings).5 Still, with the
burst of the “bubble economy” in Japan, the more recent Asian and Russian
financial crises, and notable monitoring failures by German universal banks, the tide
of opinion has lately turned against the presumed superiority of banks as monitors.
In their wake, some scholars have re-discovered the advantages of a stock market

4

Many of these efforts explicitly stressed that they were “political”
theories. See John Pound, The Rise of the Political Model of
Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 103
(1993); Mark Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance,
91 Colum. L. Rev. 10 (1991). Without question, Professor Roe’s work
been the dominant influence in this field and has spurred a new
generation of scholars to search for “political” issues and divisions in
the area of financial institutional structure.

5

Michael Porter has long been the leading advocate of this point of
view. See Michael E. Porter, Capital Disadvantage: America’s Failing
Capital Investment System, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept-Oct. 1992, at p. 65.
-5-

centered system of corporate governance, concluding that it represents a more
objective system of external monitoring that can more quickly compel firms to
respond to major changes in their economic environment.6
More recently, this initial debate about the relative merits of bank centered
systems of governance versus stock market centered systems has expanded to focus
on the relationship between a jurisdiction’s ability to finance economic development
and growth and its legal system.7 Initially, scholars started with the question: Why
does the size of equity capital markets vary so extraordinarily across otherwise
similarly situated countries? Their answer has been that these differences correlate
6

For the strongest recent statement of this view, see Jonathan Macey,
Measuring the Effectiveness of Different Corporate Governance
Systems: Toward a More Scientific Approach, 10 J. Applied Corp. Fin.
16 (1998) (arguing that prevalence of hostile takeovers in stock market
centered systems ensures their long-run superiority over blockholder
dominated systems); see also Ronald Gilson, Corporate Governance
and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 Wash.
U.L. Q. 327 (1996). For an earlier view that bank-centered systems
might have efficiency advantages, at least in connection with particular
production systems, see Ronald Gilson and Mark Roe, Understanding
the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and
Industrial Organization, 102 Yale L. J. 271 (1993).

7

See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Schleifer, and
Robert Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. Fin.
1131 (1997); see also Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Vosislav Maksimovic,
Law, Finance and Firm Growth, 53 J. Fin. 2107, 2134 (1998) (finding
that firms in countries with active stock market and well-developed
legal system were able to obtain greater funds to finance growth).
-6-

closely with corresponding differences in legal systems.8 In particular, common law
legal systems seem to outperform civil law legal systems in establishing an
environment in which securities markets can prosper and grow. For example,
common law countries have on average a ratio of publicly held stock (i.e., stock
held by non-insiders) to Gross National Product of 60%, whereas the same ratio is
only 21% for French civil law countries and 45% for German civil law countries.9
Similarly, while the U.K. has 36 listed firms per million citizens and the U.S. has 30,
France, Germany, and Italy have only 8, 4 and 5, respectively.10 Such data
understandably fascinates legal scholars because it suggests a conclusion that
financial economists tend to slight: namely, law matters.
The most convincing explanation for this sharp disparity is that only those
legal systems that provide significant protections for minority shareholders can
develop active equity markets.11 Few legal regimes meet this norm, and hence the

8

See La Porta et. al., supra note 7.

9

Id. at 1137.

10

Id.

11

This is the explanation given by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer
and Vishny, surpa note 7; see also A. Schleifer and R. Vishny, A
Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. Fin. 737 (1997). In addition, it
is, of course, possible that first mover advantages could account for the
relative size of stock markets and publicly traded equity, but in this
-7-

U.S. and the U.K. stand apart. But once this explanation is accepted, it amounts to
a rejection of the “political theory” of American corporate finance offered by
Professor Roe and others. Instead, a rival hypothesis crystalizes to replace it:
namely, dispersed share ownership may be the product not of political constraints
on financial institutions, but of strong legal protections that encourage investors to
become minority owners. Absent such protections, most investors will be reluctant
to make equity investments, except to the extent they can participate in a powerful
blockholder group or buy at sharply discounted prices--thereby accounting for
concentrated ownership as a protection against expropriation.12
This article will examine the implications of this alternative “legal
hypothesis.” Does it provide a better explanation for why powerful financial
intermediaries are observed in Europe and Japan and stock markets in the United
Kingdom and the United States? Does it suggest which of these alternative systems

respect it is noteworthy that some European stock exchanges are older
than either the London or New York exchanges (Amsterdam is
generally recognized as the oldest stock exchange).
12

While some investors may be willing to buy at greatly discounted
prices, the preference of the entrepreneurs running the firm will be
logically to organize blockholder structures that thereby maximize the
prices they receive for their shares. In short, voting control is the only
substitute for legal protections that enables the firm’s founders to
maximize the value of the shares they wish to sell.
-8-

is more likely to be the evolutionary survivor? Or is some synthesis of both theories
possible? In addressing these questions, this article will particularly focus on recent
developments within Continental Europe. Because broad similarities are obvious in
terms of the relative development and maturity of legal institutions across Europe
and the United States, this focus allows us to concentrate on the most striking
difference between these two economic systems: namely, the structure of share
ownership.13 In addition, the first destabilizing signs have now surfaced that the
13

A good sense of the high level of concentration of corporate ownership
in European economies is provided by a recent detailed survey by the
European Corporate Governance Network. See European Corporate
Governance Network, The Separation of Ownership and Control: A
Survey of 7 European Countries (submitted to the European
Commission on October 27, 1997) (hereinafter, “ECGN Survey”). For
example, in Austria, a survey of the 600 largest firms found that the
“average fractional ownership of the largest shareholder... is over
80%.” See Klaus Gugler, Susanne Kalss, Alex Stomper and Josef
Zechner, “The Separation of Ownership and Control: An Austrian
Perspective,” in ECGN Survey at p. 1. For a world-wide survey that
concludes that family controlled firms remain the dominant pattern
worldwide (with state controlled firms being the second most observed
pattern), see La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Schleifer, supra note 2.
Other recent studies are discussed supra at note 2.
The following table, taken from a recent Dutch Study, reveals the
fundamental differences in share ownership patterns between those
Continental European countries characterized by concentrated
ownership (here, Germany and the Netherlands) and the AngloAmerican market centered systems:
Share Ownership (%)

Germany
-9-

NL

UK

US

traditional system of concentrated ownership is changing across the European
context. Still, where this incipient transition will lead remains controversial. Some
predict that increased global competition will force a quick convergence in
corporate governance and structure towards the U.S. pattern.14 From this
perspective, increased global competition in both the capital and product markets
- households
-non-financial
enterprises
-banks
-investment funds
-pension funds
-insurance companies
-government
-foreign shareholders

16.6

20.0

17.7

50.2

38.8
14.2
7.6
1.9
5.2
3.4
12.2

9.6
0.7
1.5
7.9
5.5
0.0
54.8

3.1
0.6
9.7
34.2
17.2
1.3
16.3

14.1
0.0
5.7
20.1
4.6
0.0
5.4

–
22

13
6

Ownership of largest shareholder
greater than 25%
85
greater than 50%
57

–
–

See William Bratton and Joseph McCahery, Comparative Corporate
Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global
Cross Reference (Working Paper January 1999) (citing CPB
Netherlands, Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, Challenging
Neighbours, Rethinking German and Dutch Institutions at 357 (table
10.3) 1997).
14

It is impossible to list all the scholars who have made or examined this
claim in the 1990s. But for the earliest prediction of corporate
convergence on an international scale that I have found in this decade,
see Roberta Karmel, Tensions Between Institutional Owners and
Corporate Managers: An International Perspective, 57 Brook L. Rev.
55, 90 (1991).
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makes corporate governance simply another battlefield on which firms must
compete or die. The premise here is that corporate governance differs little from
other forms of technology: choose the wrong form, and (if it is important) you will
suffer at the hands of competitors who choose a superior form. For others
(including this author), corporate governance is more than simply a technology.
Infused with politics and shaped by history, it is not a variable that a firm can simply
elect or contract around. Rather, it is an important constraint that limits and
channels corporate evolution, even in very transitional times.
Viewed from afar, this debate may reduce to the usual disagreement between
neoclassical economists and other scholars over the relative strength of the forces
that shape corporate evolution. At one pole, neoclassical economists have long
argued that efficiency considerations ultimately prevail and determine corporate
structure.15 From this perspective, the prediction follows that the increasing
globalization of the world’s economy will inexorably compel at least large-scale
firms to adopt a common set of structural characteristics. The boldest of these
scholars have even predicted an “end to history” in the corporate world, paralleling
15

This theme that efficiency considerations shape corporate structures
has a long history. See Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership
and the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & Econ. 375 (1983); Frank
Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAW (1991) at 212-218.
-11-

the triumph of the market economy and democratic capitalism a decade ago at the
end the Cold War.16 Under this view, firms that employ a sub-optimal system of
corporate governance will be punished by the product and capital markets, until they
adapt or disappear.
This view--which this article will call the “Strong Convergence Thesis”--is
matched by a rival polar position, which sees not competition, but political forces
and path dependency as principally shaping and constraining economic evolution.
Consistent with their earlier work,17 Mark Roe and Lucian Bebchuk have stressed
the importance of path dependency in predicting the future evolution of corporate
governance, arguing that it will constrain and probably overcome the competitive
forces pushing for corporate convergence.18 Even earlier, other scholars have
claimed that, regardless of whether a more efficient regime of corporate governance

16

See Henry Hansmann and Reiner Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law (Draft Paper dated November 19, 1997 prepared for
Sloan Conference at Columbia Law School.

17

See Mark Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 Harv.
L. Rev. 641 (1996) (arguing that conditions existing at the time when
an institution is formed will influence its functioning far into the future,
without respect to efficiency considerations).

18

Lucian Bebchuk and Mark Roe. A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Governance and Ownership (forthcoming in Stanford Law
Review).
-12-

could be demonstrated to exist, inertial political forces would still be sufficiently
powerful to preserve the less efficient status quo.19 In short, efficiency may be only
a weak force.
Between these two rival positions, the third view–that shareholder dispersion
depends on the ability of the legal system to protect minority shareholders–occupies
an intermediate position. It can accept both the reality of evolutionary competition
and the inevitability of political constraints, but still object that neither side has
adequately explained the exceptional conditions that must exist before truly liquid
securities markets can develop to provide an alternative monitoring force. From its
vantage point, more factors must be introduced to account for the basic global
dichotomy between dispersed ownership and concentrated ownership. One critical
factor is the desire for liquidity, which inhibits potentially powerful financial
intermediaries from holding large stock positions in individual companies.20 From

19

See Curtis Milhaupt, Property Rights in Firms, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1145
(1998).

20

John Coffee, Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor As
Corporate Monitor, 91 Col. L. Rev. 1277 (1991) (arguing that
institutional investors’ preference for liquidity explains in part their
failure to hold concentrated blocks); see also, Thomas Smith,
Institutions and Entrepreneurs in American Corporate Finance, 85
Calif. L. Rev. 1 (1997) (same); Amar Bhide, The Hidden Costs of
Stock Market Liquidity, 34 J. Fin. Econ. 31 (1993) (same).
-13-

this perspective, even in the absence of political constraints, institutional investors
would rationally hesitate before investing their portfolio in a manner that costs them
liquidity. Thus, the fact that powerful financial intermediaries arose in Europe and
Japan may be better explained not by the existence of confining regulations in the
U.S., but by the absence of deep and liquid equity markets elsewhere. Denied
liquidity by thin markets, financial intermediaries in Japan and Europe arguably had
no relevant option other than to hold controlling blocks.
Although this perspective also emphasizes liquidity, law remains the critical
variable in fostering the growth of securities markets. From its vantage point,
concentrated ownership becomes the consequence of weak legal protections for
public (or minority) investors.21 Starting from the empirical observation that
minority shareholders are subject to exploitation and expropriation in most legal
regimes outside the Anglo/American world, this position postulates that the
shareholders’ primary protective response to the risk of exploitation is to invest only
through the protective medium of a substantial block-- whether assembled through a
family group, a holding company, or a reciprocal cross-shareholding arrangement.
Once these controlling blocks are created, control is often thereafter maintained by a

21

See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 7; see
also La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, supra note 2.
-14-

variety of techniques--stock pyramiding, cross-holdings, supervoting stock--that
permit the control group to retain a majority of the corporation’s voting rights, while
holding only a minority of its equity (i.e., the rights to the corporation’s cash flow).
These new studies also suggest that the prevalence of such control groups (and the
degree of concentration) is greatest to the extent that the legal protections for public
shareholders are the weakest.22
In overview, this “fear of exploitation” explanation for concentrated
ownership is virtually the mirror image of the overregulation hypothesis that Mark
Roe and other scholars have advanced to account for the seemingly fragmented
holdings of American institutional investors.23 Under their overregulation
explanation, political constraints produce suboptimal corporate governance, and
thus dispersed ownership is implicitly seen as evidence of the law’s failure.
Conversely, the legal hypothesis views dispersed ownership as evidence of the
law’s success in fostering the trust and confidence necessary to convince minority
shareholders to make and hold an equity investment. In this latter view, ownership
dispersion becomes instead a measure of the achievement of Anglo-American law in

22

See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 7.

23

See Roe, supra note 4; Grundfest, supra note 4.
-15-

protecting minority shareholders.24
To be sure, all three hypotheses--political constraints, liquidity preferences,
and minority exploitation explanations--could co-exist and contribute to a fuller
theory of ownership structure. Nonetheless, while a synthesis is possible, it should
not obscure the inevitability of tradeoffs and tensions. That dispersed ownership
requires a protective legal regime, while concentrated ownership structures tend to
arise in the absence of legal protections as the default rule, does not ultimately prove
the superiority of one system to the other. From an efficiency perspective, the
tradeoff is straightforward: concentrated ownership may yield better direct
monitoring of management, while dispersed ownership encourages the development
of a more efficient market with greater liquidity.25 From a normative perspective,
the tradeoffs may be subtler: concentrated ownership probably depends upon
blockholders receiving undisclosed side payments in return for their monitoring
24

Note that an underlying assumption here is that ownership dispersion is
the “natural” state for investors in recognition of their preferences for
liquidity and diversification. This is consistent with the view taken in
Coffee, supra note 20.

25

See text and notes infra at notes ___ to ___. In turn, enhanced liquidity
is believed to facilitate investment in longer-run, higher return projects
(such as high technology start-ups) that may spur greater economic
growth and productivity. See Ross Levine and Sara Zervos, Stock
Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth, 88 Amer. Econ. Rev.
537(June 1998) (citing other sources).
-16-

services (often euphemistically referred to as the “private benefits of control”),
thereby resulting both in a less transparent market and likely overpayments to the
controlling blockholders. Conversely, concentrated ownership may free the firm
from the obligation to maximize short-run profits and thus permit both greater
stability, greater investment in human capital, and more attention to the concerns of
non-shareholder constituencies.26
These tradeoffs can be endlessly debated, but they may also be highly
transitional, if the forces of corporate evolution are moving us inexorably in the
direction of dispersed ownership.27 Various scenarios for such a transition can
plausibly be offered, but the most plausible is the following: if concentrated
ownership is attributable principally to the vulnerability of minority shareholders to
26

See text and notes infra at notes ___ to ___.

27

A possibly intermediate position should be acknowledged here.
Ronald Gilson has predicted that formal institutional variations in
corporate law and practice will remain, but will be overshadowed by
an increasing degree of functional convergence. See Ronald Gilson,
Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function
(draft paper dated December 5, 1998 prepared for Sloan Conference).
Indeed, it is virtually true by definition that if existing corporate
governance systems possess sufficient plasticity so that their efficiency
can be improved within their existing legal and regulatory parameters,
then very different governance systems could exhibit approximately
equivalent performance characteristics. But this position frames more
of a question than an answer: is there sufficient plasticity within
institutional forms to permit functional convergence?
-17-

exploitation under most legal systems, then those legal systems that do effectively
protect minority shareholders should have an important competitive advantage in the
global marketplace. Given that stronger legal protections necessarily imply higher
stock market prices for the public (or non-controlling) shares of such firms,
corporations organized under Anglo-American legal regimes that confer such
stronger legal protections should correspondingly have higher stock market prices
and so can more easily use their equity securities to make stock-for-stock
acquisitions.28 If this premise is correct, then companies with “protected
minorities” should find it easier to acquire firms organized under other legal regimes
that provide only weaker protections, while the reverse transactions will be
generally infeasible.29 Hence, to the extent that mergers become a necessary path to
28

See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, supra note 2. This theme
is further addressed in the text and notes infra at notes __ to __.

29

At the same time, however, weaker legal protections appear to imply
higher control premiums to the controlling shareholder. Much
evidence supports the proposition that, under “weaker” legal regimes,
the controlling shareholders will be able to command a greater control
premium for their shares. See Luigi Zingales, What Determines the
Value of Corporate Votes, 110 Quarterly J. of Economics 1047 (1995);
Luigi Zingales, The Value of the Voting Right: A Study of the Milan
Stock Exchange Experience, 7 Rev. Fin. Stud. 125 (1994) (finding a
high 86% premium for control blocks on the Milan Exchange, against
an international average of 10 to 20%, and a United States average of
5.24%). Such a disparity seems strong evidence of the relative value of
control and the relative exposure of the minority. However, such
-18-

global scale, firms having higher stock market values for their minority shares are
more likely to be the survivors in any wave of consolidations.
This debate over what may happen has not yet shifted to its next predictable
stage: a policy-oriented discussion of the tradeoffs and the most effective policy
levers by which the law can influence the course and pace of this transition. The
overriding policy question seems obvious: if concentrated ownership reflects the
vulnerability of public shareholders in most of the world (but may still yield superior
monitoring in some contexts), should legal decision-makers attempt to facilitate a
transition to dispersed ownership? Or, given the difficulty of exporting
Anglo/American legal institutions, should regulators recognize concentrated
ownership as the logical equilibrium position for most of the world?
To date, most commentators have approached these questions only obliquely
by assuming that sweeping worldwide legislative reforms are unlikely. But
legislation is not the only route to functional convergence. Although this article
agrees with the path dependency perspective that formal convergence faces too
many obstacles to be predicted, it argues that functional convergence can be

evidence also implies that controlling shareholders outside the U.S. will
resist a premium that could cause U.S. controlling shareholders to sell.
-19-

facilitated by a much more feasible and largely voluntary route.30 That route runs
through the international securities markets and, in particular, involves the growing
migration of foreign firms to the U.S. equity markets. Whether through the
integration of markets, the harmonization of standards across markets, or the
migration of firms to foreign markets (chiefly in the U.S. or the U.K.), a substantial
degree of convergence seems predictable. This is so for a variety of reasons that
ultimately rest on both the need for many firms to grow in scale in order to exploit
global markets and the desire of public shareholders for a credible commitment from
these firms that they will not be exploited.
Initially, this article will seek to identify the forces at play. Part I reviews the
objections to the Strong Convergence Thesis. In so doing, it emphasizes an aspect
of the problem that has to date received little attention. Although U.S.
commentators tend to assume corporate mobility and consequent regulatory
arbitrage,31 this assumption rests largely on the fact that an American business
30

I borrow this rhetorical distinction between “formal” and “functional”
convergence from Professor Gilson. See Gilson, supra note 27.

31

The term “regulatory arbitrage” is a more neutral term for what others
call the “race to the bottom,” that is, the migration of legal entities to
the more lenient regulatory regime, with consequent pressure for
regulatory relaxation on all regulators. For the view that migration
from incorporation in one state to another state is relatively costless,
see Bernard Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political And
-20-

corporation that is dissatisfied with the corporate legal regime under which it is
incorporated can reincorporate fairly easily in another jurisdiction. As a result, for
most of this century, a vigorous competition has been waged by at least some
American states, each motivated by the goal of maximizing corporate franchise tax
revenues, to offer the most attractive terms for incorporation. Although
commentators have disagreed as to whether this competition led to a race to the top
or to the bottom,32 the fact of an interjurisdictional competition has been undeniable,

Economic Analysis, 84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 542, 586-88 (1989).
32

The original debate was between William Cary and Ralph Winter. See
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon
Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663 (1974) (arguing that competitions for
charters produces a race to the bottom); Ralph Winter, Jr., State Law,
Shareholder Protection and the Theory of the Firm, 6 J. Legal Stud.
251 (1977) (arguing competition produces a race to the top). Judge
Winter’s views have been more fully articulated by Professor Roberta
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and this in turn implies relatively free corporate mobility among jurisdictions.
In contrast, most other major industrial nations do not have federal systems,
or at least systems that permit such charter competition to develop among local
jurisdictions,33 and reincorporation outside the national jurisdiction is generally not
permitted. Corporate mobility (at least via the traditional route of reincorporation)
therefore cannot be assumed. Equally important, to the extent that corporate
governance systems outside the U.S. frequently seek to promote the interests of
non-shareholder constituencies, these regimes have also sought to prevent attempts
to contract around or otherwise escape these norms.34 Thus, a German, French,
Japanese or British firm does not face the same menu of options as to the possible
legal rules under which an American firm can organize or to which it can migrate.
In turn, the absence of such competition has probably given the substantive
33
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corporate law of these jurisdictions a mandatory character that contrasts with the
more “enabling” style of corporate law in the United States.
Part II examines other alternatives to reincorporation, with a special focus on
the motives and prospects for migration to foreign stock exchanges. Large firms can
choose the stock exchange(s) on which they are listed, and in so doing can opt into
governance systems, disclosure standards, and accounting rules that may be more
rigorous than those required or prevailing in their jurisdiction of incorporation. This
process of migration may over time prove to be as important as the standard
American interjurisdictional competition for corporate charters. In theory, migration
should give rise to a form of regulatory arbitrage, under which firms seek to play
one legal regime against another by threatening to migrate to less “regulatory”
jurisdictions. Yet, the most visible contemporary form of migration seems
motivated by the opposite impulse: namely, to opt into higher regulatory or
disclosure standards and thus to implement a form of bonding under which firms
commit to governance standards more exacting than that of their home countries.35
Part III turns to the prospects for functional convergence. If institutional
forms and legal rules are resistant to change (in part for reasons analyzed in Part I),
what degree of convergence in corporate norms can arrive through migration and
35

See text and notes infra at notes __ to __.
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securities market harmonization? Here, this article’s essential claim is that the
experience of American corporate legal history is likely to be replayed on the
international stage. That experience, as here interpreted, is for variations in local
corporate law to persist, but to be overshadowed by the relative uniformity in the
federal law applicable to securities markets. Thus, while the law of Delaware may
differ from that of California, these differences have been effectively marginalized
by the degree to which the federal securities laws force disclosure of fiduciary
misconduct and provide special remedies by which to reduce agency costs.
Correspondingly, as the law applicable to securities markets is either globally
harmonized or as foreign issuers migrate to list in U.S. markets and so become
subject to U.S. standards, the variations between the corporate laws of, say,
Germany and Italy may persist, but their relative importance should decline. Thus,
precisely in those contexts where the large blockholder in Europe or Asia has the
greatest discretion to act to its own advantage (and to the minority’s disadvantage),
the application of U.S. securities law (or some “harmonized” model largely based
on it) would instead impose transparency and significantly constrain opportunism by
controlling shareholders.36 This special focus of the federal securities laws on
36

Others have asserted that this function of reducing agency costs is the
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constraining the controlling shareholder explains not only why the competition
among American states for corporate charters has not produced great divergencies
in U.S. corporate law,37 but also why the existing (and often great) divergencies
among the corporate laws of other nations might not impede movement toward
convergence at the securities markets level. By no means, however, will
concentrated ownership patterns disappear. Rather, the likelihood is for different
markets to become specialized in trading the securities of different types of firms,
with dispersed ownership firms trading principally in markets in the U.S. and the
U.K.
Finally, this article argues not only that a high degree of convergence can
emerge through corporate migration and stock exchange harmonization, but that
convergence at this level is far more politically feasible than at the level of corporate
laws reform. This is both because of the common interest of all participants in
securities market harmonization (and the corresponding fear of exclusion) and the
extraterritorial reach of American law. Because American securities law will be
Problems, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1047 (1995).
37
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applicable to most firms that grow through mergers and acquisitions to achieve
global scale, it will similarly constrain (at least at the margin) the ability of
controlling shareholders and blockholders to engage in conduct long permitted under
local law. In this view, the U.S. securities laws should achieve what corporate law
cannot easily do: namely, accommodate functional convergence--both through
migration and harmonization--so as to raise, rather than lower, governance and
disclosure standards. Ironically, such an outcome is precisely the opposite of what
regulatory arbitrage is usually thought to produce.
The other side of the coin on this issue of political feasibility involves the
major looming downside on the contemporary horizon: the prospect for backlash.38
Although it tends to be assumed that convergence will simply promote efficiency,
the possibility also exists that there will be a counterreaction to the perceived
domination of corporate governance by American forms and norms. Once again,
however, this article will argue that the prospect for backlash can be significantly
reduced to the extent that corporate governance is chiefly implemented through
securities market integration, rather than through mandatory corporate law reform.
I. THE BARRIERS TO CORPORATE CONVERGENCE.

38
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Most observers today believe that an active monitoring board, staffed by
outside directors with substantial and varied business experience, is a critical
element in corporate governance and has contributed to the relative efficiency of the
American business corporation.39 Why then do not the forces of global competition
in both the product and capital markets impose similar governance structures on the
boards of Japanese, German and French corporations? Answers can be grouped
under the following headings.
1. Rent-Seeking and the Persistence of Inefficient Rules. Even if a particular
governance structure would make firms relatively more efficient, it is not necessarily
in the interest of all groups in society to modify existing law to permit or require
such reforms. Political coalitions within a country may have an interest in
maintaining existing legal rules, even if they are inefficient. The history of takeover
regulation in the United States provides an obvious example, as individual states
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have sought (with some success) to chill hostile takeovers for firms incorporated
within their jurisdiction. Even though such legislation may penalize shareholders,
those shareholders are typically not residents of the local jurisdiction (indeed, more
than 50% of the shares of the typical large, public corporation in the U.S. are owned
by institutional investors). Such out-of-state shareholders will have little (or at least
less) impact on legislative outcomes within that jurisdiction.
More generally, shareholders seem the classic example of Mancur Olson’s
“inchoate group,”40 namely a group that, although large in number, is not wellorganized and hence has less ability to influence political decisions than smaller, but
better organized groups (such as labor or corporate managers). Olson later
extended this theory to suggest that interest group coalitions could produce national
decline by blocking efficiency-enhancing reforms. The recent inability of Japan to
adopt needed banking reforms or of Russia to stabilize its economy--each in the face
of a world-wide consensus that reforms were needed--seem to illustrate the blocking
power of entrenched groups, who even at the cost of national paralysis are able to
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See Mancur Olson, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: Public
Goods and The Theory of Groups (1965). Olson later extended his
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stall reforms that would adversely affect them.
Next, add to this pattern the political reality that the power of labor seems
today stronger in the European than in the American context. A useful example is
supplied by the 1997 surprise hostile attempt of Krupp, the German steel and
engineering group, to takeover its larger rival, Thyssen. The bid “sent shock waves
through corporate Germany and caused political outcry... [and] triggered heated
worker protests...”41 Thyssen’s unions organized demonstrations that at one point
brought as many as 30,000 demonstrators out in protest (which protests were
focused not only at Krupp, but its politically more vulnerable investment adviser,
Deutsche Bank42). Ultimately, the hostile bid was abandoned, and political leaders
in Germany brokered a long-term consolidation and merger between the two firms,
which is scheduled to be completed in 1999. Critical to this compromise was the
reduction of threatened job losses.43
Although coalitions of labor unions and target firm managers have sometimes
goaded state legislatures in the United States to adopt rushed antitakeover
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legislation in response to hostile bids, no parallel exists in modern United States
history in which a takeover battle has required the intervention of national political
leaders in order to avert social disorder. Indeed, in the United States, although there
are “Rust Belt” jurisdictions that are extremely skeptical of takeovers for fear of job
loss and injury to local communities, there is also Delaware, home to over one half
of the largest U.S. corporations, which has always been skeptically resistant to
claims that corporate law should reflect or protect the interests of non-shareholder
constituencies. Given its federal system, the United States is a mixed bag, with
some jurisdictions that will, and others that will not, seek to frame their corporate
laws to protect non-shareholder interests.
In contrast, European corporate law has long protected non-shareholder
interests at the national level. The clearest (but not the only) example of such a
policy is co-determination, which in its German form requires that half of a large
firm’s supervisory board be made up of employee representatives. Commentators
have long opined that co-determination cripples the German board as a monitoring
body. Even if the actual impact of co-determination can reasonably be debated, the
policy is deeply rooted in German law and supported by a strong coalition of labor
and employee interest groups. Predictably, these interest groups will not be moved
by the claim that such a legal rule reduces the value of the ownership interests in a
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German firm. Rather, their interest, as employees, lies in minimizing job loss,
which, at least over the short-run, co-determination may achieve.
Why does corporate governance rank high on labor’s agenda in Europe but
not in the United States? Although a number of historical reasons could be
discussed, the critical economic fact is that labor is less mobile in Europe than in the
United States. If employment prospects are brighter elsewhere, U.S. workers can
migrate from New York to California at relatively low cost, but a German worker
cannot as easily move to Italy or Great Britain. Language and culture are also
important constraints. Even after the Common Market, Europe is criss-crossed by
national borders that, as a social matter, restrict the mobility of labor. Hence, labor
is more resistant to corporate migration in Europe than in the United States. In
contrast, U.S. workers, being more mobile, behave as if they had less need for
unions and in fact join them at a lower rate.
Even given greater labor rigidity in Europe or Asia, the neo-classical
economist might still reply that over the longer run the market will still punish a firm
whose corporate governance system gives any significant voice to non-shareholder
constituencies. Predictably, such a governance system will raise the cost of capital
to its subject firms and render them less able to compete with firms with superior
corporate governance systems. There are several practical answers to this response.
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First, the political ability to modify or update inefficient legal rules in any
country may ironically decline precisely as capital markets become more complete
in that country. Assume (as a simplifying assumption) that today German firms are
basically owned by German shareholders, with relatively few foreign investors
owning shares in German corporations; as a result, the cost of inefficiency largely
falls on German citizens, who have every incentive to pursue political means of
redress. But as capital markets become more global, the largest German firms will
become increasingly owned by a homogenized class of institutional shareholders,
most of whom will be non-German. (This is probably already true for a very few
German firms, such as Daimler-Benz). At this point, the increasing lack of overlap
between shareholders and citizens has political implications. On the simplest level,
German citizens have increased incentive to vote to maintain inefficient legal rules
that protect local jobs to the extent that costs of such action fall increasingly on
foreign shareholders. Indeed, this fact pattern parallels that of an American Rust
Belt state, whose state legislature votes to bar takeovers to protect local jobs, in part
because the shareholders thereby injured do not reside or vote in that jurisdiction.
Much like institutional shareholders in the United States, foreign shareholders
understandably tend to avoid local political controversies. The one important
difference between the two contexts is that the American firm could ultimately
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migrate from the jurisdiction to a more takeover “friendly” state if its shareholders
insisted, but such flight is not possible from a nation (if, as is typical, its laws do not
permit it to reincorporate abroad).
Economic self-interest is not the only force at work in resisting corporate
convergence. National cultural traditions, nationalism, and xenophobia (always
strong political forces) may also play a role here. One can imagine French citizens
with no other interest in the topic voting against laws that would reform French
corporate governance--simply because they were suspicious as a general matter of
the Anglo-American model of anything. Here, history truly matters.
The neo-classical economist may well concede that such a political reaction
could persist for a time, but will still question whether it will continue once local
firms begin to fail. Once the firm’s competitors begin to surpass it (because of their
access to lower-cost capital), the fear of economic failure may motivate even labor
to agree to modify inefficient legal rules. Implicit here, however, are several
debatable assumptions. First, this model implicitly assumes that other forces on the
firm and its competitors will remain equal. Yet, political forces within the particular
country may seek to protect the failing firm. The legislature could adopt
protectionist trade policies or otherwise seek to hobble more efficient competitors
(perhaps by restricting plant closings or layoffs within its borders). Although such
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efforts may just cause the more efficient competitor to move its plants outside that
country’s borders, the reality of transportation costs and logistical problems
suggests that such efforts could shelter the non-competitive firm within a local zone
of relative safety. More importantly, the domestic firm subject to the inefficient
legal rule may search for second best substitutes that reduce the significance of its
competitors’ superior corporate governance technology. In the case of codetermination, it has been reported that German firms have adapted to it by
employing alternative measures, including informal meetings between the
management board and large stockholders. The use of such substitutes, even if
marginally inferior, in turn reduces the incentive for shareholders to pressure or
lobby for change.
To generalize, corporate evolution is likely to follow the path of least
resistance. Thus, Professor Gilson has predicted the persistence of formal
deviations from the governance norms that one observes in the U.S. or the U.K., but
he still foresees a functional convergence that is sufficient to achieve competitive
equivalence and maintain the local firm’s cost of capital at a basically comparable
level.44 Functional convergence may well trump formal convergence, but the open
question that his analysis leaves unresolved is how far functional convergence can
44
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proceed before it encounters inflexible legal barriers. When these barriers are
encountered, the problem here noted is that the globalization of capital markets
actually increases the disconnect between economic ownership and political
representation. In turn, this disassociation disables shareholders from becoming
effective political actors. Concomitantly, globalization may increase the competitive
pressures for convergence, but it also may heighten some of the political barriers to
convergence.
2. Control Premiums and the Risk of Expropriation. To this point, we have
focused largely on legal rules and the prospect for rules convergence. Yet, not all
(or even most) inefficient corporate governance practices are legally mandated.
Non-transparent accounting, passive boards, and self-dealing transactions are never
truly required, and firms by a variety of techniques could credibly promise to end
such practices. For example, by listing on the New York Stock Exchange and
adopting bylaws requiring an activist audit committee, a firm might credibly signal
that it would not longer engage in certain types of transactions that expropriated
wealth from minority shareholders.
Still, it may not be in the interest of those who control the firm to make such a
commitment. To illustrate, assume hypothetically that the consequence of such a
reform package would be to increase the stock market capitalization of the firm
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from $90 million to $100 million (or over 10%). At first glance, this would seem to
benefit those in control of the firm. But, on closer inspection, the answer is
indeterminate. Suppose a control block (possibly, owned by a family) of this firm
has received (and declined) a recent offer of $50 million for its one third block.
This offer does not truly imply that the value of the firm as a whole is $150 million;
rather, it implies only that the value of the control block (under a particular set of
legal and institutional arrangements) is at least $50 million. The fact that this offer
was declined also implies that, regardless of any synergy gains that the buyer
foresaw, the control holder saw greater value in its control block. The stock
market’s seeming original valuation of this firm at $90 million (before the adoption
of the reform package) may only be its valuation of the two-thirds of this stock in
the hands of dispersed public shareholders (which the market therefore valued at
$60 million). The remaining control block could therefore be worth $50 million (or
more), implying a total firm value of at least $110 million or more.
Hence, when we say that the stock market capitalization of the firm will rise
from $90 to $100 million, this may really imply only that the adoption of the
corporate governance reforms will simply increase the value of the two thirds of the
firm’s stock in public hands from $60 million to $70 million. But these same
reforms might reduce the value of the control block, (hypothetically, from $50
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million to $40 million or less). On this zero-sum assumption (which is, of course,
not the only possibility), the de facto control group would have little interest in
adopting these reforms. Only a Coasian bribe from the public shareholders (or a
third party) could induce the control block to adopt such reforms. In short, to the
extent that corporate governance reforms increase the value of publicly held shares
by reducing the value of a control block, there may be little movement in this
direction. This would remain true even if the gains to the public shareholders more
than offset the loss to the control block holders.
This point has a generalized significance because a well-known economics
literature has shown that the average size of control premia is larger in those
economies characterized by concentrated ownership and weak minority
protections.45 This difference in the typical size of control premia cannot logically
be attributed to differences in the relative prospect for synergy gains (which is
usually the preferred explanation for control premiums), because the potential for
these gains is greater in economies having the more active mergers and acquisition
markets (which the United States and the United Kingdom certainly have). Rather,
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the more logical explanation is that the ability to expropriate wealth from minority
shareholders is greater in those countries having on average higher control
premiums. This conclusion is reinforced by the finding reached by Professors
Shleiffer and Vishny that civil law countries provide significantly weaker
protections for minority shareholders than do common law countries.46 Similarly, a
1997 report prepared for the European Commission identifies the discretionary
powers given to the controlling shareholder as the central characteristic of
Continental corporate law that most differentiates it from American corporate law
and practice.47 Against this backdrop, the greater control premia in civil law
jurisdictions reflects the lesser likelihood that courts will intervene to protect
minority (or public) shareholders from actions by the control holder that either seek
to eliminate the minority at a less than proportionate value or to otherwise transfer
wealth to the control holder.
If this is the case, the difficulties in changing this pattern are formidable. As
opposed to simply revising inefficient corporate legal rules that may have an
uncertain future impact, this type of reform effects a present wealth transfer from the
controlling shareholder to the public shareholders. In addition, the law must not
46
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only be changed, it must be enforced. To give minority shareholders the realistic
expectation that corporate wealth will not be diverted to those in control of the firm,
it is necessary to create adequate enforcement mechanisms and a much stronger
judiciary. Those who paid a control premium at midstream in the corporation’s life
to gain control will resist such a change fiercely, sincerely believing that they
purchased the right to eliminate the minority at a discount off proportionate value.
Correspondingly, they may also claim that because the public shareholders
purchased at a “bargain” price that reflected the likelihood of future wealth
expropriation by the controlling shareholder, the public shareholders would receive
an undeserved “windfall” if legal rules were revised to entitle them to a
proportionate share of corporate assets and distributions. From an efficiency
perspective, it may be clear that the economy will do better if the minority is
protected, but from a normative perspective, the respective entitlements of the
majority and the minority can be debated endlessly.
3. Complementarity. The foregoing point about the ubiquity of patterns of
concentrated share ownership in much of the world leads to a much general
observation: what is efficient in one context may not be efficient in another,
especially if reforms are implemented on a piecemeal basis. Any specific corporate
governance practice--for example, the majority outsider board--is embedded in a
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broader institutional matrix, including a characteristic ownership structure. Thus, a
particular practice or legal rule probably can only be efficient in any given context if
it is compatible with the other practices (including ownership structure) that prevail
in that context. To illustrate, consider whether it would be efficient for a firm based
in an Asian country to adopt an American-style monitoring board of outside
directors when the firm’s major competitors had management teams and boards
largely staffed with personnel having close contacts with the government then in
power. Even if one does not rely on the perhaps overly cynical assumption that
“crony capitalism” prevails in much of the world, it still could be true that, in an
economy characterized by cross-ownership and a preference for dealing (either as a
lender, borrower, supplier, or customer) with established trading partners, it would
be useful to have a board populated by representatives of such trading partners and
economic allies. In short, having an “independent” board when other firms are
using their boards to knit together a closely-linked web of interlocking alliances may
be a counterproductive innovation. Innovations, even if copied from a well
recognized model, must be able to adapt to local conditions if they are to survive.
In turn, this requires that even a potentially efficient reform fit into the complicated
jigsaw puzzle of existing institutional arrangements, and this implies that corporate
evolution needs to be gradual and incremental, because most abrupt mutations do
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not survive.
4. Path Dependency.
Much national variation in corporate governance reflects the impact of path
dependency upon the evolution of economic systems. Although a complex concept,
the core idea in path dependency is that initial starting points matter. Whether
established by historical accident or political compromise, initial conditions direct
an economy down a particular path of development from which there is no easy
return. Possibly, the best known example of path dependency producing an
outcome that is seemingly inefficient is that given by Professor Roe: the relatively
small scale of financial intermediaries in the United States seems in substantial part
to be the consequence of a U.S. political tradition that was profoundly skeptical of
concentrated financial power.48 Much smaller than their European and Japanese
counterparts (both proportionately to domestic GNP and in absolute terms), U.S.
financial institutions were dwarfed by the interaction of a federal system (which
long denied banks the ability to spread beyond a single state) and a populist distrust
of concentrated financial power (which resulted in part in the Glass-Steagall Act’s
divorce of commercial and investment banking) . The upshot was a proliferation of
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local financial intermediaries in the United States that were too small and too legally
constrained to serve as effective monitors of U.S. industrial corporations.
Nor is the U.S. unique. Political compromises, sometimes in long forgotten
battles, resulted in the lifetime employment system in Japan and co-determination in
Germany. Neither practice appears to be an efficient adaptation,49 but both have
persisted.
The important implication of path dependency is that, once events have been
set in motion and historical forces have produced significant national variations in
the structure and design of economic institutions, there may be no universal answer
to the question of what incremental changes are most efficient. Indeed, the same
market forces could produce inconsistent evolutionary adaptations in different
economic environments. A good illustration of this possibility has been suggested
by Professor Jeffrey Gordon. He begins with the fact that “thin” equity markets in
Germany have not generated significant equity capital for German corporations (at
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least in percentage terms), and that German corporations have consequently placed
greater reliance on debt financing.50 But his real point is that a natural “fit” exists
between reliance on debt and a system of bank monitoring. In a heavily leveraged
firm, he observes, Anglo/American style corporate governance would not work
well. Indeed, the standard corporate finance literature recognizes that in such a
world, if corporate control were assigned to a board of directors responsible only to
the shareholders, perverse incentives would arise for the equity shareholders to
pursue inefficient strategies (from the standpoint of the firm as a whole) that
transferred wealth from the creditors to the equity. Professor Gordon’s point is not
that bank monitoring is inherently superior to monitoring by equity representatives,
but that the optimal answer to the monitoring problem is contingent on the
characteristic capital structure that firms in a particular economic environment have.
If the starting point is heavy reliance on debt (for any of a number of exogenously
determined reasons), then the optimal governance solution is unlikely to be the
characteristic Anglo/American one of a board responsible only to its shareholders.
Instead, financial structure and governance structure must be jointly determined. If
path dependent factors pre-determine the issue of financial structure, then
governance structure becomes the dependent variable. In turn, the prospect of
50
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convergence towards a single system of corporate governance begins then to look
increasingly remote.
5. The Possible Superiority of Blockholder Governance
The most subversive possibility has been held for last. Although concentrated
ownership aggravates a host of normative problems and inherently produces both a
thin and non-transparent securities market, it may yield better monitoring of
management. Large blockholders are inherently superior monitors than dispersed
shareholders, because dispersed shareholders are subject to a free rider problem:
small shareholders lack the incentive to incur monitoring costs that primarily benefit
other shareholders.51 Blockholders will rationally incur larger costs, given their
larger ownership. Unfortunately, controlling blockholders are also able to engage in
private rent seeking that benefits themselves (but not other shareholders) as
management. For some scholars, this combination of superior monitoring and
private rent seeking represents an efficient solution. They argue that concentrated
ownership essentially subsides blockholder monitoring “by permitting blockholders

51

For example, even a large institutional investor holding 1% to 2% of a
firm’s stock must recognize that 98% of the benefit of any gains that
flow from its monitoring efforts will be enjoyed by other shareholders.
For an 80% blockholder, however, this is a less serious problem.
-44-

to reap private benefits through self dealing and insider trading.”52 The problem
with this rationale is that there is little assurance that this subsidy is cost effective;
rather, the remedy of blockholder “monitoring” may be worse than the disease of
managerial opportunism. Worse yet, in many forms of concentrated ownership, the
blockholder is a family group, and the line between the blockholder “monitor” and
the management team (which may also involve family members) often breaks
down.53 On such occasions, minority shareholders may experience the worse of
both worlds: self-dealing blockholders who overlap with a family-based
management.
Market centered systems clearly make a more determined effort to restrict
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such private rent-seeking by blockholders.54 But, as least as a theoretical matter, it
is indeterminate whether the greater ability of a market centered system to police
conflicts of interest fully compensates for its lesser ability to monitor for
inefficiency. Further, it can at least be argued that market centered systems tend to
be characterized by inefficient pressures to maximize profits over the short-term55
and by an inability to protect firm-specific investments in human capital by
managers.56 In principle, these tradeoffs are indeterminate, at least in the absence of
better empirical data. This article will argue, however, that, even if the optimal
structure of corporate governance cannot therefore be confidently stated, the
instability of the blockholder system can be predicted, for reasons that are next
addressed.
II. THE MECHANISMS OF CORPORATE CONVERGENCE
Although the foregoing discussion has stressed the barriers to convergence in
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corporate governance, significant legal and economic transitions are clearly in
progress. Some involve changes in the governance structure of economies formerly
characterized by concentrated ownership and a reliance on bank monitoring; other
transitions involve the decisions of individual firms to migrate abroad and opt into
foreign governance standards (through either listing agreements or IPOs). Most
importantly, the pace of change is very uneven. As will be seen, much more
progress has been made towards convergence at the level of securities regulation
than at the traditional level of corporate law and structure. The possible reasons for
this disparity will be assessed after recent developments are first reviewed.
1. The Growth of European Stock Markets. European stock markets have
traditionally been regarded as “thin”--that is both illiquid and volatile.57 The
traditional pattern has been one of relatively few initial public offerings (on either an
annual basis or based on the jurisdiction’s population). Typically, local stock
market capitalization has amounted to no more than a small percentage of gross
domestic product (“GDP”). For example, Germany has Europe’s largest economy
and GDP, but in 1995 just three issuers accounted for a third of the trading volume
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in German equity markets, and the top six issuers accounted for nearly 50%.58
Similarly, the ratio of total stock market capitalization to GDP contrasts sharply
between Germany and the United Kingdom. In Germany, stock market
capitalization was 17% of GDP, but the corresponding ratio was 132% in Great
Britain.59 In the United States, in 1995, the stock capitalization of the New York
Stock Exchange and NASDAQ were, respectively, 80.4% and 16.5% of U.S. GDP,
or nearly 87% in total.60 Nor is the Germany situation unique. For Italy, the
corresponding 1995 ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP was 19.3%.61 More
importantly, almost no Italian companies were publicly held.62
From a path dependent perspective, the anemic status of German stock
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markets is easily explained by an obvious “interest group” explanation: banks do
not want rivals and so retard the growth of the securities industry. The power of the
banking industry is particularly strong in Germany, and thus one would expect them
to keep securities markets underdeveloped, particularly for smaller businesses that
would have to depend on bank financing. The problem with this logical story is that
its validity is rapidly waning. The German financial landscape is in rapid transition,
and there is already a “widespread sentiment among political actors that the system
of bank-centered finance is hindering German economic development.”63 Several
recent privatizations, most notably of Deutsche Telekom in 1996, have been aimed
at developing a “‘shareholding’ culture” among German citizens.64 Across Europe,
both 1997 and 1998 have been years of record IPO activity, and the approaching
arrival of an eleven nation “Euro zone” is widely expected to spur further increases
in trading volume and probably result in a true pan-European equity market.65
Although much of this activity has been the product of large privatizations of
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formerly state owned firms, a closer look at the data reveals that the majority of the
new offerings (in dollar volume) in 1998 have been corporate offerings, not
privatizations.66 This means that firms that typically have been privately held within
families for many years have opted to sell minority stakes to the public in this new
environment.67
Particularly noteworthy has been the success of the German Neuer Market, a
new small company market, patterned after NASDAQ’s small capitalization market,
to attract listings by start-up companies.68 Over the last year, it has tripled its
listings to 43.69 Although venture capital and entrepreneurial start-ups have long
been absent from the German (and Continental) landscape, they now appear to be
making a vigorous appearance.
The pace of change has been even more dramatic in Italy. Italian
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corporations have typically been family controlled and have raised capital through
bank loans and retained cash flow. But, between 1995 and 1997, the ratio of the
capitalization of the Italian Stock Exchange to Italian GDP rose from 19.3% to
31.3% (or more than 50%).70 Behind this rise lies two important developments: (1)
a major privatization program (which began in 1993 and which was impelled in
large measure by the desire of the Italian government to reduce budgetary deficits in
order to qualify for the European Monetary Union), and (2) major changes in the
laws governing the Italian securities industry, partly in order to comply with a
European Community Investment Services Directive that was designed to encourage
cross-border competition among securities firms.71 Until well into this decade, there
were ten separate stock exchanges in Italy (although the Milan exchange was by far
the dominant market), each operating as an “open outcry” trading floor with little
regulation. Over the last two years, they have been consolidated into a single
computerized market, which is now privately owned and operated as a for profit
company, and regulated by CONSOB, which is an SEC-like administrative agency.
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A 1991 legislative reform also authorized the formation of securities firms (where
previously only natural persons could qualify for stock exchange membership),
established capital requirements, and restricted conflicts of interest.
The development of European securities markets has been partially fueled by
a liberalization of cross-border activities by securities firms. The Investment
Services Directive authorized all EU securities firms to conduct cross-border
operations anywhere in the EU based only on the license issued by their home
state.72 Thus, well capitalized British firms (or subsidiaries of American firms
licensed to do business in Britain) can now enter the Italian market (or any other EU
market with limited capital) and add liquidity.
The last chapter in the Italian story is perhaps the most relevant to this
article’s concerns. In 1998, Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi pushed a package
of reforms through the Italian Parliament that increased disclosure standards,
strengthened the regulatory powers of CONSOB, and revised Italian corporate
governance to increase protections for minority shareholders.73 Chief among these
governance reforms was a provision that required a mandatory takeover bid by any
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person or group who acquires thirty percent or more of a publicly listed company.
This provision, which roughly parallels British and French law, is both a
paradigmatic example of rule convergence and a protection designed to reduce the
ability of insiders and others to assemble control blocks cheaply. Press accounts
noted that the reform was intended to discourage a common Italian phenomenon:
“covert alliances of shareholders who own less than 51 per cent of the share capital
between them.”74 Other reforms halved from 20% to 10% the required percentage
of shares necessary to call a special meeting of shareholders and otherwise
enhanced proxy voting.75 Equally important, a proposal that business groups
advanced was rejected which would have protected large firms from hostile
takeovers by denying any hostile bidder the ability to cross 15 per cent without
making a full public offer.
Of course, it remains to be seen whether these protections will prove
adequate to assure minority shareholders, but one measure of success has been the
upsurge in Italian initial public offerings. It is estimated that there will be over 25
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IPOs in Italy in 1998, almost double the number in 1997.76
More generally, an IPO boom spread across Europe in 1998, with the demand
for IPO shares regularly outstripping the supply.77 Although this rosy scenario for
increased European IPOs has since been clouded by the Russian financial crisis,78
some factors encouraging the growth of European equity markets seem likely to
persist: (1) across Europe, a significant number of major privatizations (particularly
in the telecommunications field) are planned and in the pipeline, thus assuring a
continuing supply of IPOs and a probable increase in the aggregate European stock
market capitalization,79 (2) the adoption of the “Euro” as the common currency unit
(in early 1999) will facilitate pan-European equity trading and the cross-listing of
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shares on multiple exchanges; (3) corporate governance reform, including both
greater protections for minority shareholders and increased financial transparency,
has proved to be popular with the center/left political coalitions that today hold
power in a number of European states,80 and (4) EU regulation will continue to fight
local protectionism and seek to open up securities and financial markets to crossborder competition. Whatever the short-term movements in financial markets, all
these forces are likely to produce increased competition and convergence.
The foregoing developments have been emphasized at some length because
they fly in the face of the conventional wisdom. That wisdom held that active stock
markets could not easily develop in economies long organized around strong banks.
Thus, a path dependency theorist could logically predict that opposition from banks
would stifle any potential competition from stock exchanges. Nonetheless, the
recent evidence shows that securities markets are developing, and convergence at
this level is occurring, even in the face of a mature banking industry. Possibly, this
is because European political leaders have recognized that the development of
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securities markets robustly correlates with future economic growth.81 If so, at least
within this context, the proponents of the claim that competition will force
convergence seem currently to have the better of the argument with the proponents
of path dependency.
2. Disclosure Harmonization versus Corporate Law Reform
For over a decade, the European Community has pursued harmonization of its
securities regulation and disclosure rules in order to achieve a common market for
securities.82 In principle, harmonization can be pursued by one of two alternative
81
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approaches: reciprocity or commonality. Under the former approach, all member
states agree to recognize and permit use of a disclosure document that qualifies in
the issuer’s home country, while under the latter, common rules and disclosure
documents are agreed upon. Harmonization in the EU has largely compromised
these two approaches: a single disclosure document can be used for the offering of
securities in any member state, so long as the disclosure requirements mandated by
the issuer’s home country satisfy EU-mandated minimum standards.83 Beginning in
1979, the EU has adopted a series of securities-oriented directives governing (1) the
minimum requirements for the admission of securities for trading on a stock
exchange in any EU member state, (2) the minimum disclosure requirements for
securities offerings in any member state; and (3) periodic reporting requirements.84
Alone, these steps represent substantial convergence at the level of securities
regulation (although member states remained free to impose more stringent
requirements upon domestic issuers).
While directives addressed traditional areas of securities regulation (and did
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not attempt to harmonize corporate law norms) the European picture changes
dramatically once the focus shifts from securities regulation to traditional corporate
law. Attempts by the European Union during the 1980s to adopt directives dealing
with takeover bid procedures, board structure of publicly held companies, and
employee rights have all largely failed amidst considerable controversy.85 In
general, either Great Britain would object to attempts to place employee
representatives on the corporate board,86 or Continental countries would object to
attempts to generalize the British takeover rules. By 1997, an expert panel reported
that cultural attitudes differed so fundamentally within Europe on these questions
that attempts to develop a harmonized single standard were destined to fail.87
This tendency for harmonization efforts to become controversial once the
focus shifts to substantive corporate law continues to date. In October 1998, efforts
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to draft a takeover directive again ended in deadlock, as the UK’s Takeover Panel
velimently resited the proposed draft.88 The takeover directive may yet be
salvaged,89 but possibly at the cost of framing it in extremely generalized and nonconfining terms. To some extent, this has been the prior history of corporate control
directives in the European Union. While the takeover in the United States has
functioned as a device for downsizing oversized and inefficient conglomerates, the
European Union’s Acquired Rights Directive severely limits the ability of a bidder
to lay off excess employees or reduce wages in the wake of an acquisition.90 Hence,
whatever the fate of the current takeover directive, the hostile takeover may never
play the same disciplinary role in Europe that it has in the United States. Again, this
softening of the takeover’s potential impact reflects the greater political power of
labor across Europe and the more powerful legacy of the European social welfare
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state.
The line between corporate law and securities regulation is fuzzy at best, and
it is revealing that proposals that have fallen in the seam between these two fields
have encountered considerably more opposition than have pure disclosure
proposals--but they have still been adopted. A good example is provided by the
Transparency Directive.91 Less an attempt at harmonization of existing legal rules
than a bold attempt to adopt a new rule that would require public disclosure of the
often very non-transparent ownership structures that characterize the European
system of concentrated ownership. Issued in 1988 by the Council of Europe, the
Transparency Directive was intended “to increase investors’ confidence in
securities markets” by assuring equivalent disclosure of control data about listed
companies.92 Similar in scope and spirit to the Williams Act in the United States,
the Transparency Directive applied to listed firms registered anywhere in the
European Union. Basically, it required any natural person or legal entity to notify
the issuer and the local governmental authority within seven calendar days after the
person or entity’s voting rights exceeded or fell below any of the following
91
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thresholds: 10%, 20%, 33 1/3%, 50% or 66 2/3%. Local law was permitted to vary
these standards only slightly. In addition, the Transparency Directive recognized
the reality of control groups by requiring the aggregation of voting rights within a
business group or pursuant to a formal shareholders agreement or proxy
arrangement. Informal groups were not, however, covered.93
How successfully has the Transparency Directive been implemented? Much
depends on one’s perspective, but the results have clearly been uneven. Prior to the
directive, German corporate law required disclosure only when an individual’s or
entity’s stake exceeded 25%. Thus, the Transparency Directive did mandate a
significant change. But, revealingly, the effort to implement the Transparency
Directive set off a prolonged political battle in Germany. While the directive was
supposed to have been adopted by local legislation by 1991 (and was in many other
European countries), Germany did not adopt conforming legislation until 1994, in
part because the very idea of transparency in ownership structure aroused
controversy and disrupted long-held assumptions about the right to anonymity.94
This struggle has carried over into the compliance stage. A 1997 study of the
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implementation of the Transparency Directive by the European Corporate
Governance Network criticized the implementation of the Transparency Directive
across Europe95 and concluded “that the Directive, at the moment, fails to achieve
its objectives.”96 A variety of predictable problems were identified: the compliance
efforts of some member states were not adequate; too little disclosure was provided
about the blockholder’s intent and plans; informal groups escaped coverage; and the
data that was reported was often inaccessible to shareholders.97
Fairness requires the balancing observation that some progress has been
made. Some states--most notably Italy and Belgium--have exceeded the
Transparency Directive’s minimum requirements. For example, ownership
disclosure in Belgium is now required as of the 5% level (or 3% if the company so
chooses), must be filed within 48 hours, is checked by a governmental agency, and
is made publicly available in an on-line database accessible to investors that is run
by the stock exchange.98 Similarly, Italy now requires that equity holdings of more
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than 2% in listed companies must be reported to CONSOB (the Italian SEC) within
48 hours, and the data is also made available to the public through an online
computer system.99
Why has securities harmonization largely succeeded, while corporate law
harmonization has been largely frustrated? A variety of reasons can be given: (1)
disclosure harmonization sounds neutral and technocratic and does not on its face
challenge long-established social policies; (2) securities harmonization is necessary
for the development of a pan-European stock market and cross-listings, which are in
the common interest of most issuers; and (3) securities harmonization can be largely
accomplished at the administrative level and does not require national legislatures to
act (thereby inviting political rivalries to enter the picture). Still, as the more
controversial experience with the Transparency Directive shows, considerable
resistance has arisen when the law has sought to change the behavior of individuals
(here, shareholders and families) or to change a long established cultural tradition
(here, the desire for ownership anonymity). Thus, both sides in the debate over
corporate convergence are correct, but at different levels.
3. The Appearance of Institutional Investors
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Although banks play a major role in some European securities markets (most
notably Germany), other institutional investors, such as pension funds and mutual
funds, have historically played no more than a minimal role on the European
Continent. The absence of pension funds has been largely attributable to generous
public pension systems across Europe. But this pattern has begun to change. In
1993, Italy passed its first legislation to regulate pension funds (which statute was
again amended in 1995). A more liberal tax law was also passed to encourage their
formation. Following the American model, Italian pension funds may not hold
more than 5 percent of the voting shares of any listed company (10 percent in the
case of non-listed companies) and may not acquire “direct control” of a company.
Similarly, Italian law restricts open-end mutual funds to parallel 5% and 10%
ownership ceilings and also prohibits their acquisition of control. Whatever the
wisdom of these provisions, they promise a new form of fragmented shareholding:
small block holders. In turn, such shareholders are both exposed to exploitation and
motivated to seek protections.
The development of pension funds in Europe still faces significant obstacles.
In September, 1998, fund management associations from six European countries
united to seek relief through the European Community from investment restrictions
placed on pension fund equity investments by local law (most notably in France and
-64-

Germany).100 Arguing that existing restrictions on equity investments “have a
significant detrimental effect on the development of European-funded pensions [and]
on the European economy,”101 they called for the substitution of an American-style
“prudent man principle” that would leave asset allocation decisions up to fund
managers. A preliminary draft of a pension fund directive is expected to endorse
this idea, but also to encounter opposition from the French and German
governments.102 Again, this confrontation not only parallels the American experience
but also frames another test case for the convergence hypothesis. Path Dependency
Theorists and neo-classical economists would probably make different predictions
about the eventual outcome of this battle, but it is already significant that a draft
directive liberalizing investment restrictions is under serious consideration.
Given continued growth, these institutional shareholders may come to play a
similar activist role to that played by their Anglo/American cousins. The key
difference is that they will function for the foreseeable future in a concentrated
ownership environment where small blockholders have less power. If they are
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unlikely to be powerful enough to change local law, they might still pressure their
portfolio firms to secure foreign exchange listings and utilize the protections
available to them under foreign law.
4. The Harmonization of International Accounting Standards
In July 1995, the International Accounting Standards Committee (“IASC”), a
private international organization, and the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (“IOSCO”) reached an agreement to develop a core set of
international accounting standards (“IAS”) with the expectation that on completion
of this project IOSCO would endorse these standards for use in cross-border
financings and for listings in global stock markets.103 A draft is now expected in
early 1999. Obviously a response to the globalization of the world’s securities
markets, this effort, if successful, would eliminate the need to reconcile an issuer’s
financial statements from its home jurisdiction’s format to those of the
jurisdiction(s) in which it wished to seek financing.
The IASC has already published some thirty standards dealing with a broad
array of accounting topics, and the harmonization effort faces only modest obstacles
103
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on the European scene. But the SEC’s willingness to accept IAS standards for use
in the United States remains a more problematic and unresolved issue. In April,
1996, the SEC issued a statement that supported the IASC’s efforts, but that also
specified rigorous criteria that would have to be satisfied before such standards
could be used without reconciliation in the United States.104
The SEC’s reservations appear to stem mainly from domestic concerns: if it
permits foreign issuers to issue securities in the United States based on even
marginally relaxed financial standards, can it long deny U.S. issuers the same
ability?105 Will it be seen as placing U.S. issuers at a competitive disadvantage by
subjecting them to a more costly regulatory burden? Sensitive as
this problem is for the SEC, it probably affects only when and not whether IAS
standards will become usable without reconciliation in the United States.106 For the
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European issuer, even if the SEC accepts IAS standards, another unresolved
question involves whether such an issuer can as a practical matter use this lesser
standard of disclosure in the United States. Will securities analysts and institutional
investors demand more?
In any event, the swift movement toward accounting harmonization in Europe
again reveals that some forms of convergence do not encounter cultural obstacles or
political resistance. Indeed, private lawmaking by standard-setting groups (such as
the IASC) seems to largely sidestep obstacles that legislative efforts normally
encounter.
5. Migration to Foreign Markets. In principle, it is not strictly necessary to
reform local law in order for functional convergence to occur. Instead, firms
seeking any of variety of goals--to raise equity capital, to increase share value, or to
make acquisitions for stock--may decide to list on a foreign stock exchange and
thereby opt into foreign governance standards.
The number of foreign listings on the principal U.S. exchanges reveals the
extent of this international migration. As of the end of 1996, there were 416 foreign
listings on NASDAQ, 305 on the New York Stock Exchange, and 63 on the

Standards By 2002,” 68 The CPA Journal 14, (July 1998) at 15.
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American Stock Exchange, for a total of 784.107 This number continues to grow
rapidly. From 1992 to 1998, the foreign listings on the New York Stock Exchange
more than tripled from 119 to 361.108 In addition, as of 1996, the London Stock
Exchange had 533 foreign listings (although many of these were undoubtedly U.S.
firms).109 Of the 13,000 companies now registered with the SEC as “reporting”
companies, it is estimated that more than 1,000 are foreign.110
The accelerating pace of this migration may seem surprising when one
realizes both that foreign issuers incur extensive regulatory costs when they enter
the U.S. markets and most have never thereafter made securities offerings in the
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U.S.111 Why then do they list? Arguably, companies in smaller markets gain
liquidity and possibly also some international recognition and prestige from a U.S.
listing. But greater motivation probably lies in the finding, repeatedly observed by
financial economists, that the announcement of a dual listing on a U.S. exchange by
a foreign firm typically increases the firm’s share value.112 This may also seem
surprising, because entry into the U.S. securities markets may force the issuer to
revise its previously reported earnings downward (as happened to Daimler-Benz113).
One explanation for the abnormal price movement on a U.S. listing is that
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While foreign issuers list, they seldom make primary offerings in the
U.S. This may be attributable to a fear of the litigation remedies that
they would face in the U.S. under the Securities Act of 1933 or to the
additional accounting requirements of the SEC when a foreign issuer
seeks to register securities for sale (in which event the SEC requires
not simply reconciliation to U.S. GAAP but full compliance therewith).
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When Daimler listed on the New York Stock Exchange in 1993, it was
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a swing of nearly DM 2,554. See Paul Pacter, supra note 103, at 14.
Obviously, this turnaround can both embarrass a management and
cause uncertainty for investors and thus represents a deterrent to a U.S.
listing. Nonetheless, foreign firms continue to list at an increasing rate.
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such a listing represents a “bonding” mechanism: the foreign issuer is increasing the
share value of its public shares by agreeing to comply with the generally higher
disclosure standards that prevail in the U.S.114 Some evidence supports this
interpretation (as opposed to the explanation that dual markets simply increase the
demand for the stock) because other studies have found that when a U.S. issuer lists
abroad on a foreign exchange, the opposite occurs: its shares exhibit negative
abnormal returns.115 This negative movement may be because the market expects
114

Professor Edward Rock has studied the initial public offering process
in Israel, which typically involves a “high-tech” start up company in
Israel listing on NASDAQ as an integral part of the offering process.
He concludes that an “unappreciated function of the U.S. mandatory
disclosure regime is the extent to which it permits issuers to make a
credible commitment to a level and permanence of disclosure.” See
Edward Rock, Mandatory Disclosure As Credible Commitment: Going
Public, Opting In, Opting Out and Globalization” (Working Paper, Oct.
14, 1998) at p.2. In essence, this is the same bonding thesis. See also
Asher Blass, Vishay Yafeh, and Oved Yosha, Corporate Governance
In An Emerging Market: The Case of Israel, 10 J. App. Corp. Fin. 79,
86-89 (1998) (finding that high quality Israeli IPOs listed on
NASDAQ, while lower quality offerings listed on Tel Aviv Stock
Exchange and that portfolio investors tended to invest in the former
offerings, but not the Tel Aviv offerings). Such self-segregation again
seems to support the bonding thesis.
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consequence, become “reporting” companies subject to the SEC’s
mandatory disclosure system. See Darius Miller, Why Do Foreign
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that the foreign listing will facilitate undetectable insider trading on the foreign
exchange or other conduct impermissible in the United States.
The migration of foreign firms to the U.S. represents more than isolated
decisions by individual firms. In some economies, resort to the U.S. capital markets
appears to be a standard stage in a firm’s economic development. The clearest
example of this pattern has been the extraordinary phenomenon of Israeli firms
effecting IPOs on NASDAQ. By some estimates, over 100 firms incorporated in
Israel are now listed on the New York Stock Exchange, NASDAQ or the American
Stock Exchange116; of these, more than 70 are high-tech companies.117 In effect, in
the words the NASD’s chief executive officer, NASDAQ has become “a capital-

Firms List in the United States: An Empirical Analysis of the
Depositary Receipt Market (1996) (unpublished) (cited in Licht, supra
note 107, at 634). The importance of this finding is that these issuers
had already overcome market segmentation by establishing an ADR
facility, but had not yet become subject to U.S. mandatory disclosure
rules. See SEC Rule 12g3-2(b) (providing exemption for such foreign
issuers upon filing of home country financial statements). Thus, the
upgrade isolates the impact of the differential between SEC reporting
requirements and home country requirements.
116

See Ira Greenstein and Lloyd Harmetz, “U.S.-Israel Transactions
Present Unique Issue,” New York Law Journal, April 27, 1998 at p.
52.
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See Richard Rappaport, “Beating Their Swords Into IPO Shares,”
Forbes, June 1, 1998 at p. 93.
-72-

raising engine for the Israeli economy.”118 Despite the small size of the Israeli
economy, only Canada of all foreign countries has more listings on U.S.
exchanges.119 Interestingly, this process has occurred almost entirely in this decade.
Nor is the Israeli experience entirely unique. From 1991 to 1997, international
equity issuances in the U.S. have grown at a 26% annual rate.120 Mexican firms
and those of several other Latin American countries have also made IPOs in the
United States.121
The Israeli pattern is particularly interesting because it shows reality behaving
in exactly the opposite manner that the academic conventional wisdom had
predicted. Academic commentators have generally predicted that competition
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See The Reuter European Business Report, “U.S. NASDAQ Wants
Share of Israeli Privatization,” April 16, 1997 (available on LEXIS;
News; Curnws file) (quoting Frank Zarb, chief executive officer of the
NASD).
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See Rappaport, supra note 117, at p. 93. Some 12 Israeli IPOs were
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For example, in 1997, TV Azteca effected a $650 million IPO (as part
of a privitization) through Bear Stearns. See Robinson, “Year End
Review: Latin America Markets,” Investment Dealers’ Digest January
12, 1998 at p.43.
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among national securities disclosure regimes would invite “regulatory arbitrage” (or,
in more vivid terms, a “race to the bottom”), as issuers played one system against
another.122 Yet, the Israeli pattern shows that the interaction among different legal
regimes can be complementary. Indeed, Israeli securities law in some important
respects has been intentionally integrated with U.S. securities laws in order to
facilitate joint U.S.-Israeli securities offerings. Market integration may itself
represent an important form and measure of convergence.
The Israeli experience also underscores that some firms migrate to the U.S.
markets because it is infeasible to effect an IPO in their own country. This difficulty
may again reflect the lack of sufficient minority legal protections to attract equity
investors in their country.123 A revealing fact in one recent study is that the average
newly listed company is “much older and larger in Italy than in the United States.”
Specifically, this study concluded that:
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See Licht, supra note 107, at 635-36 (making this point that prior
commentary had focused only on competition among different legal
regimes and overlooked the possibility of complementary and mutually
reinforcing interaction).
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Controlling premiums in Israel appear to be the second highest in the
Western world (second to only those in Italy), thereby suggesting that
minority protections are limited. See Ronald Lease, et. al., The Market
Value of Control in Publicly-Traded Corporations, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 439
(1982); Macey, supra note 53, at 684.
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“The typical Italian IPO is 8 times as large and 6 times as old as the typical
IPO in the United States.”124
Nor is the Italian experience unique. For Italy, from 1982 through 1993, the average
age of companies that went public was thirty-three years.125 In fact this is better
than the overall average for European companies engaging in IPOs, which another
study has computed at forty years.126 Both figures contrast sharply with the U.S.
experience, where venture capital backed firms go public after an average period of
five years.127
What explains this age differential between the U.S. and Europe? Given that
the transaction costs of an IPO appear to be roughly comparable, the most obvious
and logical explanation is that the relative absence of legal protections for minority
shareholders makes it more difficult for young companies to win the trust and
confidence of investors.128 Older companies have higher reputational capital, which
124
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57, at 29.
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enables them to compensate for the shortfall in legal protections.
6. The Need for Global Scale. Besides the desire to increase their stock
price, other, more powerful reasons may explain the interest of foreign corporations
in listing on a U.S. securities exchange. The decision by Daimler-Benz, A.G.
(“Daimler”) to list on the New York Stock Exchange in 1993 and to comply with
very different accounting requirements that greatly reduced its reported earnings
today comes into focus as probably a prelude to Daimler’s 1998 acquisition of
Chrysler Corporation in what was essentially a stock for stock exchange. Had
Daimler been traded only in Germany in a much less liquid market and subject to
less transparent disclosure requirements, the acquisition of Chrysler for Daimler
stock would have likely been unattractive to Chrysler shareholders, and it is likely
that the acquisition would have been infeasible as a cash transaction.
Yet, the Chrysler transaction (or some alternative) may have been critical to
Daimler if it believed that it needed to increase its scale in order to compete globally
in the future. Interestingly, Daimler has already announced plans to enter into some
form of affiliation with Japan’s Nissan Diesel Motor Co, the fourth largest truck
maker in Japan, which development does indeed suggest that it plans to increase its
scale of operations significantly. Even more revealing has been the behavior of
other large German firms. Although other German firms initially disapproved of
-76-

Daimler’s decision to list on the NYSE, a growing number have followed its lead.129
In a world of global competition, the fear of small and mid-sized firms (or at
least their managements) is that they must “eat or be eaten”--that is, grow in size
into one of the largest firms in their industry or expect to become acquisition targets.
Industry observers have seen this motivation underlying both British Petroleum’s
$48 billion merger with Amoco, Ford’s acquisition of Volvo, and Mobil’s proposed
merger with Exxon. At the level of small firms, the problem is even more pressing.
Students of Italian corporate governance have predicted that its characteristic firm-small and family held with virtually no outside investors--is uniquely threatened by
increased competition within the European Union because the small Italian firm had
survived largely based on its established satellite relationship with a larger (and
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In August 1998, SAP, the fourth largest German company in terms of
market capitalization, listed on the New York Stock Exchange. See
“Corporate Germany Reaping the Rewards of Risk Taking.” Financial
Times, August, 11, 1998, p. 20. Hoechst, the German chemical and
pharmaceutical, giant, has also recently listed. See “Survey-German
Banking and Finance 198: A Unique Perspective,” Financial Times,
June 24, 1998 at p.7. Finally, Siemens AG, the largest German
industrial corporation next to Daimler, has indicated its intent to shift to
US GAAP by 2000 and list on the New York Stock Exchange by
2001. See Nicholas Bray, “International Accounting Rules Catch On”,
Wall Street Journal, Oct. 21, 1998 at p. B19D.
-77-

inefficient) state controlled firm.129 With active cross-border competition, this
equilibrium is unlikely to continue, and the smaller family firm is no longer viable.
Thus, whether for managerialist motives or to pursue true economics of scale and
scope, European firms increasingly perceive themselves under a need to grow in
order to survive in a truly global economy.
This perceived need to grow globally is most easily satisfied through crossborder equity mergers (of which both the Daimler/Chrysler and B.P./Amoco
transactions represent recent examples). This can present difficult legal challenges,
particularly when the legal regimes of the two participants have seemingly
incompatible legal rules. Although U.S. lawyers and scholars are used to relatively
free corporate mobility between state jurisdictions, the rules are quite different on
the international level, at least for some important jurisdictions. At present, there is
considerable legal uncertainty in Germany as to whether a domestic German
corporation can merge with a foreign corporation.130 Although a cumbersome share
129
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exchange procedure was devised in the Daimler/ Chrysler transaction that produced
the functional equivalent of a merger, the current reality is that triangular mergers
are disfavored by German law, and any attempt to merge Daimler into Chrysler in a
direct or triangular merger would probably not have worked.131 Moreover, it was
even clearer that German’s co-determination laws required any company doing
business within Germany, which employs more than certain specified numbers of
employees, to comply with its mandates.132 Thus, if global scale is necessary, some

“There’s no such thing in German law as a merger between a
German company and a non-German company.”
See “Bar Talk: The Gamma Project: The Marriage of Chrysler and
Daimler,” The American Layer, June, 1998, at p. 13 (quoting Meredith
Brown of Debevoise & Plimpton).
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CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS & MERGERS in GERMANY (1991)
at 48. Instead, acquisitions are chiefly accomplished through share or
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Under the Co-Determination Act (Mibestimmungegesetz) 1976, the
supervisory board of a German corporation (including both AGs and
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than 500 employees. Id. Where a controlling foreign parent holds the
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See The GERMAN Co-DETERMINATION ACT (Hannes Schneider
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potential acquirors may be hobbled by their inability to escape domestic social
policies (such as co-determination) that elsewhere seem outmoded.
Important as these constraints on free corporate mobility are, another feature
of the Daimler/Chrysler union may merit even greater emphasis: Chrysler
shareholders agreed to accept shares in a German corporation in a zero premium
“merger of equals”, which transaction resulted in their enjoying far less protections
as minority shareholders. Why should U.S. shareholders accept less legal
protections without a takeover premium? The most logical answer is that U.S.
shareholders (and Chrysler executives) placed heavy reliance on Daimler’s listing
on the New York Stock Exchange. To be sure, Daimler may also have enjoyed
sufficient reputational capital so that Chrysler shareholders were willing to accept
their potential legal vulnerability. Still, this possibility that reputational capital can
substitute for legal protections affects only a limited number of corporations:
namely, those with “brand name” reputations (as Daimler certainly had), or, at the
least, with substantial business histories.133 Otherwise, the U.S. or U.K. firm will be

and David Kingman eds.) (1976) at 23.
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Pagano, Panetta and Zingales, supra note 57, found that Italian
corporations needed a substantial business history (on average 33
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the preferred acquiror if the transaction involves an equity component.134
The implication then is that, if a wave of global merger occurs, the acquirors
will tend to be either firms with high stock values (because their legal regimes
protect minority rights) or firms with high reputational capital. Either way, the
family held firm is likely to be left in the wake, becoming either a target or a
bystander.
III. SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE
To this point, this article has examined in succession the barriers to
convergence in corporate governance and then the forces impelling
convergence–and found both powerful. This section will turn to the actual
interaction of these contending forces and make several predictions.
A. Functional Convergence Should Dominate Formal Convergence.
An implicit, but overly facile assumption of the political theorists who believe
that convergence will be blocked by legislative inertia and special interests is that
134

Ford’s acquisition of Volvo’s automobile assets is another case in
point. Volvo’s shareholders were adamant that they preferred Ford to
Fiat or Renault, the two other most likely merger candidates. See
Edmund Andrews, “‘Ford-Volvo’: A Deal For All Sweden”, N.Y.
Times, January 30, 1997, at p. C-1. Renault shares were particularly
resisted by Swedish shareholders, because it was viewed as a statecontrolled company, which was unlikely to maximize the share value of
Volvo or provide Swedish stockholders with a liquid investment
vehicle. Id. at C-2.
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convergence can only arrive through legislative amendment of corporate codes.
Yet, formal structural changes may not be necessary if functional changes,
implemented by other means, can bring the relative efficiency of competing
governance systems into relative parity. Essentially, Professor Gilson has made this
point, arguing that we should anticipate functional convergence in corporate
governance systems, but not necessarily major legislative or structural changes in
formal rules or institutions.135 Gilson’s analysis relies heavily upon the research of
Steven Kaplan and others, who have found that across very different governance
regimes and institutional settings, senior managements appear to be replaced and/or
disciplined at about the same rate in response to poor economic performance by
their firms.136 Such evidence suggests that very different structural systems of
governance have reached relatively similar levels of efficiency.
Still, a difficulty remains in using this data to conclude that functional
convergence is approaching: namely, this evidence is equally consistent with future
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See Steven Kaplan, Top Executive Turnover and Firm Performance in
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Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and
the U.S., 102 J. Pol. Econ. 510 (1994); Steven Kaplan and Bernadette
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stasis as with future change. If managers in Germany, Japan, and the U.S. will get
the proverbial axe for about the same level of substandard performance (and thus all
face roughly the same margin for error), the logical inference to be drawn from this
finding is that a measure of functional convergence has already arrived. Further
convergence cannot necessarily be inferred, as the systems may be at a competitive
equilibrium. Rather, change would become predictable on this basis only if one of
these competing governance systems further tightened its own standards and thereby
destabilized the current equilibrium.
Put differently, given the institutional barriers to convergence, functional
convergence is predictable only to the extent that one governance system begins to
outperform another. Then, and only then, does a competitive response become
necessary. Assume, for example, that the legal governance rules in each competing
system are, hypothetically, twenty percent inefficient in the aggregate. As a result,
each system can tolerate its own national idiosyncracy (for example, codetermination in Germany) and need not respond to the fact that, in a given area, the
rules of a competing system are more efficient.
Still, such a tacit collusion in inefficiency can continue only so long as the
equilibrium is not disturbed by destabilizing changes. The Asian and Russian
financial crises may have had a destabilizing impact on much of the world. A need
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to reform corporate governance in light of these crises has been widely perceived,
and financial assistance from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
has been conditioned on efforts to end the former system of “crony capitalism.”
New functional adaptions then seem most predictable within this systems that have
been most disrupted by the recent financial crisis.
B. The Motor Forces for Functional Convergence
Even if the overall efficiency of national governance systems were more or
less comparable, individual firms might still find it necessary to revise their own
governance structure as the result of competitive pressures. One such pressure is
the perception, shared by many large firms operating in international markets, that
they must grow in scale to survive as viable independent firms. In common, the
otherwise dissimilar mergers between Daimler and Chrysler, Deutsche Bank and
Bankers Trust, British Petroleum and Amoco, Ford and Volvo, and Exxon and
Mobil, exemplify this pattern. To the extent that acquiring firms are incorporated in
jurisdictions that protect minority shareholders (i.e., the U.S. or the U.K.), the
acquiring firm has the option of using its own shares as the consideration for such a
merger. Two consequences follow from this option: (1) such firms may be able to
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economize on the costs of achieving the desired global scale,137 and (2) in a crossborder merger, the firm incorporated in the minority protecting legal regime is more
likely to be the surviving entity.138
At first glance, the Daimler/Chrysler transaction seemingly stands as an
obvious counterexample: in that case, Daimler, the firm with less protections for its
minority shareholders, emerged as the surviving company and used its shares as the
medium of exchange. But to effect this acquisition, Daimler found it necessary to
revise its governance structure in advance of the merger, beginning with its 1993
decision to list on the New York Stock Exchange. Such a listing, which entails new
governance and disclosure standards, is a paradigmatic example of functional
convergence.
Ultimately, the important lesson in the Daimler/Chrysler merger is that the
Chrysler executives were willing to exchange their shares (and options) for a
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Of the recent cross-border mergers, only Deutsche Bank’s bid for
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German company’s shares--at least when the latter’s shares were listed on the New
York Stock Exchange. This willingness may have been significantly predicated
upon the assurance of full disclosure (which an NYSE-listing conveys). In addition,
because the Daimler/Chrysler merger significantly diluted the position of Deutsche
Bank,139 the long-time controlling shareholder of Daimler, Chrysler shareholders had
less to fear the misuse of the broad powers given a controlling shareholder under
German law.140
Under this scenario, the prediction is not that Anglo/American firms will
acquire European firms until the latter become scarce. Family-controlled firms may
well resist any overtures, because, as earlier explained, the value of their controlling
shares can exceed the per share price that the acquiring firm will pay for the firm as
a whole.141 But, to the extent that a need for global scale is perceived to exist, large,
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It is estimated that Chrysler shareholders will receive 44% of the stock
in the merged entity. See Tagliabue, “Germans Reject Challenge to
Daimer Stock Options.” New York Times, August 13, 1998 at D-4.
In addition, American institutional investors may have already held
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American shareholders may own a majority of the merged entity.
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but threatened, firms in major international industries will seek merger partners.
The recent spate of cross-border mergers both evidences this and suggests that more
such transactions are likely. In this mating dance, those firms able to issue higher
valued shares with minority protections have a significant advantage.
The desire to effect an equity merger is by no means the only reason to seek a
U.S. listing. The firm’s management may have a variety of other motives. First, by
expanding the firm’s shareholder base, it may enable management to dilute a
controlling shareholder whose iron hand the issuer’s managers want to see
relaxed.142 Second, a U.S. listing will predictably increase the company’s stock
price (and thereby placate shareholders).143 Third, a U.S. listing may enable the
firm’s managers to institute U.S. style stock option plans, which U.S. institutional
investors can be expected to accept (but at which European investors may frown).
From a managerialist perspective, the difference in pay scales (particularly as a
result of stock options) is striking between U.S. and European firms. One statistic
from the Daimler/Chrysler merger is truly startling: the entire ten members of the
Daimler managing board received in the aggregate less compensation (around $12.3
142

While Deutsche Bank’s supervision of Daimler hardly amounted to an
“iron hand” rule, the Daimler-Chrysler merger did dilute its stake to
15%, which seems below the level sufficient to confer control.
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million) in the year before the merger than did Chrysler’s second ranking officer
(who received slightly more than $13 million).144 Chrysler’s CEO alone stands to
receive over $69 million in stock and cash in the merger in respect of outstanding
Chrysler stock options and bonuses that he had previously been issued.145 Given
that German CEOs typically receive much less,146 this disparity creates an incentive
to internationalize one’s shareholder base, both by listing on U.S. stock exchanges
and by effecting cross-border acquisitions that will bring in U.S. shareholders.
Already, there are signs that the prior hostility of German law to U.S. style
executive compensation is being relaxed.147
C. The Regulatory Costs of a U.S. Listing: A Survey
Whatever the motives for seeking a U.S. listing, the foreign issuer must
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balance the projected benefits from listing in the U.S. against a very real increase
both in regulatory costs and the potential for litigation. Once an issuer lists today
either on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ, the U.S. securities laws become broadly
applicable to it.148 This is critically important because the U.S. securities laws do
not simply require heightened disclosures and more rigorous financial reporting;
rather, they also seek to reduce agency costs in ways that particularly inhibit
controlling shareholders and that are not closely paralleled by European law.
Historically, the federal securities laws were originally focused on compelling
disclosures by promoters and other controlling persons.149 That is, the primary goal
148

Essentially, foreign issuers that have more than 300 shareholders of
record in the U.S. are in theory required to register under §12(g) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. However, an exemptive rule affords
them an easy escape from the U.S. periodic disclosure system so long
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Mahoney argues that the federal mandatory disclosure system was “an
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of both the British Parliament and the U.S. Congress was less to mandate disclosure
of all material information relating to firm value than to focus on the special (and
then well recognized) abuses by which promoters overreached shareholders, in
particular by using the proceeds of the stock flotation to buy property from the
promoters at inflated prices.150 Although the goals of the federal securities laws
have broadened, this focus on reducing “agency costs” has persisted. According to
one scholar, “the most substantial innovation” of the U.S.’s mandatory disclosure
system “was the use of disclosure after the promotional stage to combat
manager/shareholder agency problems....”151 In short, both as they were originally
adopted and as they have evolved, the federal securities laws have focused on
monitoring the relationship between controlling shareholders or managers and their
firm.
The following provisions of the federal securities laws are likely to surprise
the foreign issuer, because they go well beyond requiring material disclosures by the

incremental change from a longstanding set of judicial doctrines that
were designed to control a special agency problem–the promoter
problem.” Id. at 1111. Related agency problems arise whenever there
is a controlling shareholder, as there typically is in legal regimes
characterized by concentrated ownership.
150
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issuer and seek in effect to impose substantive obligations on managers and
controlling persons, essentially in order to minimize agency costs. Because prior
commentary has largely ignored this focus of the federal securities law, an extended
examination is necessary:
1. Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act. This critical provision requires any
person (or group) owning beneficially more than 5% of any class of equity security
registered pursuant to §12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange
Act”) to file a report (known as a Schedule 13D) within 10 days after the 5%
threshold is crossed.152 The differences between this provision and the European
Community’s Transparency Directive are notable: (1) the trigger level is 5%, not
10%;153 (2) a broad definition of beneficial ownership in §13(d) deems a person to
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The statutory command to make a disclosure filing in §13(d) is fleshed
out by Rule 13d-1(a). Rule 13d-1(b)(1) then permits institutional
investors under certain conditions to file a shorter, less burdensome
document, known as a Schedule 13G, within 45 after the conclusion of
the calendar year. Sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the Exchange Act do
not apply to equity securities of issuers that must file periodic reports
only by reason of §15(d) of the Exchange Act because the issuer made
a public offering in the United States. This exemption, however, will
not benefit issuers traded in any public market (other than a very small
bulletin board market), as §12(g) will require registration if there are as
few as 300 shareholders resident in the U.S.
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See text at note __ for the 10% threshold under the Transparency
Directive.
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be an owner if the person has (or shares) the power to vote or to buy or sell the
security, directly or indirectly, through any contract, arrangement, understanding,
relationship or otherwise;154 (3) section 13(d) also requires disclosure of the identity
of persons who agree to act in concert with respect to more than 5% of any class of
voting equity security “for the purpose of acquiring, holding, voting, or disposing of
equity securities”155–thereby sweeping many informal coalitions within §13(d)’s
coverage; (4) the Schedule 13D filing must be amended promptly following any
material increase or reduction in the filing person’s holdings (or in the composition
of the group)156; (5) Schedule 13D requires much fuller disclosure than does the
Transparency Directive, covering not only the identity of the acquiring person or
group, but also the source and amount of funds used to acquire the securities, the
purpose of the acquisition, and the nature of any arrangements to which the acquiror
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See SEC Rule 13d-3 under the Exchange Act.
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See SEC Rule 13d-5(b)(i) under the Exchange Act. See also Wellman
v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069
(1983). No formal or written agreement is necessary to give rise to a
§13(d) group. See SEC v. Savoy Industries Inc., 587 F.2d 1149 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 913 (1979); GAF Corp. v. Milstein,
453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972).
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See Rule 13d-2 under the Exchange Act. For a discussion of this
“promptness” requirement, see SEC Litigation Release No. 12835
(April 11, 1991).
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is a party relating to the target company’s securities.157 These disclosures can (and
often do) become the subject of litigation in the U.S. courts as either the target
company, the SEC or others seek to use §13(d) as a window by which to peer into
the acquiring group and learn its plans. In turn, this means that the process of
preparing a Schedule 13D is complicated and costly and will almost certainly
involve the retention of U.S. counsel.
Most importantly, the beneficial ownership reporting requirements of §13(d)
apply to both U.S. and foreign persons who hold the requisite amount of voting
securities in a firm that is registered under §12 of the Exchange Act.158 Thus, if a
French citizen buys over 5% of the voting stock in an Italian corporation, which is
listed on NASDAQ, the reporting requirements of §13 are triggered, even if the
stock is purchased on an Italian exchange and no jurisdictional means within the
U.S. are employed. This same conclusion also holds if the Italian company only
listed American Depositary Receipts (or “ADRs”) on the U.S. exchange, as the
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See §13(d)(1) of the Exchange Act. See also Items 2-6 of Schedule
13D.

158

For an excellent overview of the application of the Exchange Act to
foreign persons and entities, see Edward F. Greene, Alan L. Beller,
George M. Cohen, Manley O. Hudson Jr., and Edward J. Rosen, U.S.
REGULATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES AND
DERIVATIVES MARKETS (4th ed. 1998) at §7.02.
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SEC looks through the ADRs and requires the underlying security to be registered
under §12.159
Suppose then that the Italian corporation lists on NASDAQ in 1998 and
registers under §12(g) of the Exchange Act. Must all its existing 5% or greater
blockholders file a Schedule 13D within 10 days? Here, the SEC has made a small
concession and permits the filing to be made on a delayed basis. Because these
securities were acquired prior to the §12(g) registration, the SEC deems the
requisite filing to be under Section 13(g) of the Exchange Act, which must be made
within 45 days after the close of the calendar year.160 Still, this new obligation could
be an abrupt surprise for many large blockholders.
The fact that U.S. law imposes this obligation does not mean that it can
necessarily enforce it. A high rate of non-compliance is probable (particularly with
regard to informal groups). But because of the Transparency Directive, persons
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See Securities Act Release No. 6894 (May 23, 1991) (the “ADR
Concept Release”); see also Greene, et. al., supra note 158, at §7.02,
p. 7-4.
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Schedule 13G must be filed within 45 days after the close of the
calendar year. See Rule 13d-1(b)(2). Although technically the
Schedule 13G is only available to U.S. institutional investors (and only
under certain conditions), a series of no-action letters have permitted
foreign institutional investors to use this simplified form. See Greene,
et. al,.supra note 158, at §7.02, p. 7.5 n.8.
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owning 10% of a European-listed company should already be disclosing their
identity, and thus could become conspicuous targets if the SEC (or others) wished to
cross-check. Having thus found at least some persons required to file under §13(d),
the SEC could demand far more disclosure under its rules.
2. Tender Offers Under §14(d) of the Exchange Act, if any person (including
a European corporation) makes a tender or exchange offer for more than 5% of any
class of equity securities of a target corporation (including another European
corporation) that is registered under §12 of the Exchange Act, that offer must
comply with the disclosure and procedural requirements of §14(d). Even if the
target is not so registered, the antifraud rules of §14(e) of the Exchange Act will still
apply if the offer is made to U.S. residents. Thus, U.S. tender offer disclosure rules
could apply to a tender offer by a foreign bidder for a foreign target corporation,
which had 1% or less of its stock held by U.S. residents.161
161

In a 1990 Concept Release, the SEC proposed exempting foreign
bidders from the procedural and disclosure provisions of the Williams
Act where (1) the target was a foreign corporation, and (2) 10% or less
of the target’s outstanding shares were held of record by U.S.
shareholders (other than U.S. citizens who were 10% or greater
shareholders). See Securities Act Release No. 33-6866 (June 6, 1990).
The SEC also indicated that the civil liability provisions in §14(e) of
the Exchange Act would continue to apply. The SEC has recently
moved to implement this proposal. See Securities Act Release No.
7611 (November 13, 1998). Even if it were adopted, the proposed
10% threshold would leave most large multinational firms listed on the
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Not only does U.S. law thus potentially apply, but its substantive provisions
(particularly regarding timing, withdrawal, and proration rights) are significantly
different from those of many other countries. For example, U.S. law gives each
shareholder of the same class the opportunity to participate in the offer on a
proportional basis and to receive the “best price” paid to any other shareholder
pursuant to the tender offer.162 Moreover, although the term “tender offer” is not
defined by the Williams Act, the SEC has long taken the position that negotiated
purchases can under certain circumstances amount to a de facto tender offer,163
which conclusion will almost invariably mean that U.S. law has been violated.
Because of the extraterritorial reach of the U.S. securities laws, the potential
exists that U.S. law could directly conflict with the tender offer rules of another
country (most likely those of the jurisdiction of the target company’s incorporation).
The SEC has recognized the need to minimize such regulatory conflicts and has

NYSE fully subject to U.S. tender offer law.
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See SEC Rule 14d-10 under the Exchange Act.
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The SEC has long used an eight factor test to determine whether
closely-linked purchases amount to a tender offer. See SEC v. Carter
Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945, 949-52 (9th Cir. 1985);
Wellman v. Dickinson, supra note 139, at 823-26. Under this test,
efforts by a controlling shareholder to buy shares from insiders at a
common price could give rise to a tender offer with a concomitant
obligation under Rule 14d-10 to open the offer to all shareholders.
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granted a number of exemptions on a case-by-case basis to accommodate
concurrent foreign and domestic bids for foreign target corporations.164
Bidders have also sought to avoid the application of U.S. tender offer law by
making tender offer bids open only to persons resident outside the United States.165
It remains an open and resolved question, however, whether the SEC (or private
parties) could successfully challenge a tender offer for a company registered under
§12 that excluded U.S. residents.166 In any event, many bidders will not want to
leave a significant percentage of minority shareholders outstanding in the U.S. after
their offer and so are compelled to negotiate with the SEC over the terms of a partial
exemption from U.S. tender offer rules.
3. Corporate Governance. Although listing on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ
does not subject an issuer to U.S. corporate law, it is necessary for any issuer
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For a review of SEC policy toward concurrent foreign and domestic
tender offers, see Greene, et. al., supra note 158, at §7.03(3). See also
SEC Release No. 34-27671 (Feb. 2, 1990).
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See Greene et. al., supra note 158, at §7.03[4].
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Some informed commentators have opined that the SEC would today
likely take the view that the bidder cannot avoid compliance with the
Williams Act by excluding U.S. residents from the offer, at least in the
case of an issuer whose equity securities were registered under § 12 of
the Exchange Act. See Greene, et. al., supra note 158, at §7.03[4][b]
at p. 7-25.
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(foreign or domestic) to enter into a listing agreement with the New York Stock
Exchange (“NYSE”), the American Stock Exchange (“AMEX”), or NASDAQ in
order to have its securities traded on such market. These listing agreements all
contain corporate governance provisions (although those required by NASDAQ and
AMEX are somewhat less demanding).167 For example, the standard NYSE
requirements specify that a listed company must (a) have at least two outside
directors on its board, (b) establish and maintain and audit committee composed of
independent directors, and (c) set an appropriate quorum requirement for
shareholder meetings.168 Other NYSE corporate governance policies, including its
voting rights policy which precludes certain deviations from a “one-share, one-vote”
standard,169 do not apply to foreign issuers or are subject to waiver if counsel opines
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For an overview of these requirements see Greene et. al., supra note
158, at §2.03[2][b].
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See NYSE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§303.00 AND
310.00(A).

169

The NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ have a common voting rights policy
that precludes actions that disenfranchise shareholders of stock traded
in their markets or dilutes their voting strength. This policy specifically
prohibits any disparate reduction of voting rights through any corporate
action or issuance of stock, including plans that cap voting rights for
any shareholder or that require a holding period before voting rights
become fully exercisable. See SEC Release No. 34-35121 (Dec. 19,
1994).
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to the NYSE that local law precludes such a policy.170 Still, the NYSE does insist
on some minimum governance standards for all issuers, including (i) an audit
committee, or a similar body, to monitor transactions between the company and its
insiders, (ii) an annual shareholders’ meeting, and (iii) a requirement that any tender
offer made by the company for its own shares (or for those of another listed
company) give all holders of the target an equal opportunity to participate.171 Both
the AMEX and NASDAQ follow substantially similar policies.172
4. The SEC’s “Going Private” Rules. Under Section 13(e) of the Securities
Exchanges Act of 1934, the SEC is granted authority to regulate purchases by an
issuer registered under §12 of its own shares to the extent that such rules are
“reasonably designed” to prevent “fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative” acts. This
authority also extends to purchases by a controlling person or affiliate of the issuer.
Pursuant to this authority, the SEC has adopted Rule 13e-3 to regulate “going
private” transactions, and its reach goes well beyond that of other SEC antifraud
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See Greene et. al., supra note 158, at §2.03[2][b] at pp. 2-21 to 2-23.

171

See Greene, et. al., supra note 158, at §2.03[2][b] at pp. 2-23 to 2-24.
(discussing non-waivable provisions of NYSE corporate governance
policies).

172

Id. at §2.03 [2][c] and §2.03[2][d].
-99-

rules.173 Under Rule 13e-3, the triggering test is whether the proposed transaction
would result in the issuer losing its listing on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ or no
longer being held of record by more than 300 persons. In short, if the controlling
shareholder threatens its public shareholders with a loss of liquidity, Rule 13e-3
applies and requires elaborate disclosures pursuant to which the SEC gains the
ability as a practical matter to assess the fairness of the transaction.174
Although Rule 13e-3 could certainly slow a European blockholder that was
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Rule 13e-3 requires a detailed evaluation of the fairness of the
proposed transaction, including a detailed assessment of the material
factors upon which the issuer’s claim that the transaction is fair is
based. See Instruction to Item 8(b) of Schedule 13E-3. Failing this
mandatory disclosure, the transaction can be enjoined or damages
sought. There is thus no need to prove a material omission if the
specific justifications and evaluation strikes the court as inadequate.
See Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470 (6th Cir. 1987).
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Among other things, the issuer is required to focus on fairness by
describing the purpose of the transaction, the alternatives considered,
and the effect of the transaction, including the benefits and detriments
to the issuer and affected securities holders. See Schedule 13E-3, Item
7. If an outside report or valuation is utilized, there must be a summary
of the report and information about how the outside party was selected
and how the compensation of such party was to be determined. See
Schedule 13E-3, Item 9. Most importantly, Item 8 of Schedule 13E-3
requires the issuer (or the affiliate filing the Schedule 13E-3) to state
that it “reasonably believes that the Rule 13e-3 transaction is fair or
unfair to the unaffiliated security holders” and then requires the issuer
or affiliate to “discuss in reasonable detail the material factors upon
which the belief... is based.”
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intent on squeezing out minority shareholders at an unfairly low price, the ultimate
impact of Rule 13e-3 may seem open to doubt, because it is simply a disclosure rule
and the federal securities laws do not provide any remedy for a fully disclosed
breach of fiduciary duty.175 Experience has shown, however, that relatively few
fiduciary breaches are ever fully disclosed (at least in the SEC’s eyes). Thus, the
rigorous disclosure standards in Rule 13e-3 function in practical effect as an
effective substitute for rules requiring substantive fairness. In addition, a private
cause of action has been recognized under Rule 13e-3, with the result that a class
action can be maintained for its violation.176
Because foreign issuers are generally subject to SEC Rule 13e-3 (if the
foreign issuer is listed on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ177 or if it has issued
securities for a U.S. “reporting” company178), listing on a U.S. exchange carries with
it the obligation to justify in great detail the fairness of any squeeze-out transaction.
The net impact might be to substantially neutralize the traditional and formidable
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See Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1997).
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See, e.g., Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470 (6th Cir.
1987) (upholding private cause of action under Rule 13e-3,) aff’d, 927
F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1991).
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See SEC Rule 12g3-2(d)(3), 17 C.F.R. 240.12g3-2.

178

See SEC Rule 12g3-2(d)(2), 17 C.F.R. 240 12g 3-2.
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powers of a controlling shareholder under German law--if the foreign issuer had
“listed” its stock on a U.S. exchange or NASDAQ or entered into a merger with a
U.S. company.
5. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. All issuers–foreign or domestic–who
become subject to Section 12 of the 1934 Act acquire a legal obligation to “make
and keep books, and records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately
and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer,”179 and
to “devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to
provide reasonable assurances that” certain specified standards will be satisfied.180
Both these statutory obligations share a common purpose: to preclude the use of
corporate funds to make bribes or other “questionable payments” and to discourage
the creation of “off books” accounts that can be used for such purposes. SEC rules
also prohibit any corporate officer or other person from, directly or indirectly,
falsifying or causing to be falsified “any book, record or account” subject to these
rules.181 Hence, at least as a formal legal obligation, listing in the U.S. disables a
foreign corporation from engaging in bribery or similar practices to obtain contracts
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See §13b(2)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

180

See §13(b)(2)(B) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

181

See SEC Rule 13b2-1. 17 C.F.R. §240.13b2-1.
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or regulatory approvals or otherwise market its services.
Although an international consensus has been reached (at least among the
major industrial nations) that bribery to obtain business contracts (either
domestically or abroad) should be unlawful,182 U.S. securities and criminal law
alone today enforces this norm.
6. The Extraterritorial Reach of Rule 10b-5. Under the dual “conduct” and
“effect” tests used by the U.S. courts to determine the extraterritorial reach of Rule
10b-5, a U.S. court has subject matter jurisdiction if either (a) the foreign
defendant’s activities in the U.S. went beyond a “merely preparatory” level and
involved actions or culpable failures to act that “directly caused” the claimed
losses,183 or (b) a predominantly foreign transaction has “substantial effects” in the
United States.184 In its most important recent decision on the subject, the Second
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In 1998, Congress approved an international convention sponsored by
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
that committed each OECD nation to criminalize such bribery. See
“Congress Passes Bill to Curb International Business Bribery, “New
York Times, October 22, 1998 at p. A-5.
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See Leasco Data Processing Equipment v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326
(2d Cir. 1972).

184

See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v.
Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 492 U.S. 939
(1989).
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Circuit has upheld subject matter jurisdiction based on Rule 10b-5 in a case
involving at bottom only a substantial purchase of stock in a U.K. company by a
Channel Islands subsidiary of a Bermuda holding company.185 The decisive factor
for the Second Circuit appears to have been that 10% of the U.K. target company’s
stock traded on NASDAQ in the form of ADRs. Given this broad reach, a foreign
issuer listed on a U.S. exchange must realistically assume that it can be sued in the
U.S. for any allegedly false statements made anywhere in the world if the statements
would foreseeably impact a U.S. securities market. Although some commentators
have viewed the broad extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities law as
“dangerous,”186 and various compromises have been proposed to curb its reach,187
the current reality is that a U.S. listing entails a substantial litigation risk.
Incomplete as this selective tour of the impact of the federal securities laws
on foreign issuers has been, it suffices to support the following generalization: the
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Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group Plc, 54 F.3d 118 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 116
S.ct. 702 (1996).
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See Stephen Choi & Andrew Guzman, The Dangerous
Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. Int’l L. &
Bus. 207 (1996).
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Donald Langevoort, Schoenbaum Revisited: Limiting the Scope of
Antifraud Protection in an Internationalized Securities Marketplace, 55
Law & Contemp. Probs. 241 (Autumn 1992).
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U.S. securities laws have a special constraining impact on controlling persons.
Much of the discretion and potential for opportunistic actions that controlling
shareholders can take under other legal regimes is sharply limited by these laws.
Specifically, federal law regulates controlling shareholders at the following critical
junctures:
(1) its ownership disclosure rules deny them the veil of anonymity by
requiring a transparent ownership structure pursuant to §13(d) of the
Exchange Act;
(2) its insider trading rules restrict (with criminal penalties) their ability to
purchase or sell based on material, nonpublic information;188
(3) its tender offer rules assure all shareholders an equal opportunity to
participate in any tender offer for their shares;
(4) its continuous disclosure system generally requires timely disclosure of
material developments by the issuer or controlling shareholders, and
(5) its “going private” rules deny the controlling shareholders the practical
ability to squeeze out the minority at an unfairly low price.
The more pervasive and inhibiting these restrictions on controlling
shareholders appear to be, the more the apparent mystery deepens as to why foreign
issuers seem to be migrating in record numbers to U.S. exchanges.189
188

See United States v. O’Hagan, 117 S.Ct. 2199 (1997).
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As noted earlier, foreign listings on the New York Stock Exchange
have recently tripled, over one thousand foreign issuers now trade in
U.S. markets, and the trend seems to be increasing. See text and notes
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Correspondingly, this pattern also raises a normative policy question that is next
addressed: Should U.S. law attempt to impose quasi-substantive restrictions on the
foreign issuer who wishes to enter the United States markets?
D. The Case for Mandatory Rules.
Three different sets of arguments will be advanced in this section, but they
have a common theme: dispersed ownership requires special legal rules if it is to
persist. Firms listed in the same market have a greater interdependency than is
generally appreciated, because of what this article will call “network externalities.”
As a result, it becomes appropriate for U.S. law not simply to protect U.S. investors,
but also to protect its capital markets.
1. Listing As a Bonding Mechanism. The simplest explanation for the
migration of foreign issuers to U.S. exchanges and NASDAQ is that such a listing is
a form of “bonding”--a credible and binding commitment by the issuer not to exploit
whatever discretion it enjoys under foreign law to overreach the minority investor.190
supra at notes __ to __.
190

“Bonding” is, of course, a term of art in the standard “agency cost”
literature. Essentially, the principal can either “monitor” the agent to
reduce inappropriate conduct by the agent, or the agent can “bond” its
own conduct (for example, by posting a surety bond or otherwise
subjecting itself to penalties). See Michael Jensen and Williams
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs,
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305, 308 (1976).
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That is, the issuer ties its own hands by subjecting itself to the mandatory
requirements of U.S. law in order to induce minority shareholders to invest in it.
The problem with this explanation, however, is that the issuer may simply
have decided to list for other reasons: to expand its shareholder base, to gain the
advantages of increased liquidity, or to overcome market segmentation.191 How
then can one distinguish true efforts at “bonding” from simply an attempt to gain a
broader shareholder base? The answer probably lies in the motivation for the listing
transaction. If the issuer has already listed elsewhere, enjoys a liquid market, and
does not use its U.S. listing to make a primary offering into the United States, then
its entry into the U.S. markets does not look like a pursuit of greater liquidity, but
may be an effort to increase its stock price through bonding. Even more clearly,
when the U.S. listing is incident to an initial public offering (which has often been
the case with Israeli “high-tech” companies) or where the issuer is contemplating a
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While market segmentation (i.e., the existence of barriers to crossborder capital flows) supplies an alternative explanation for multiple
and global stock listings, financial economists have recently preferred
the bonding explanation. See Oren Furst, A Theoretical Analysis of
The Investor Protection Regulations Argument for Global Listing of
Stocks (Working Paper International Center for Finance at Yale
September 10, 1998); see also Blass, Yafeh, and Yosha, supra note
114, at 86-87 (noting that high quality Israeli IPOs have preferred to
list in the U.S. on NASDAQ, whereas lower quality IPOs have listed
on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange).
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prospective equity merger, then there is even more reason to view “bonding” as the
appropriate description. As noted earlier, European firms on average have been
unable to effect an IPO until they were decades older and much larger than the
typical American firm doing an IPO.192 By entering the U.S. markets, a foreign
issuer may thus be able to make an equity offering that could not be made in its
home market. But the reason that it cannot sell equity in its home market may be
the fear that its controlling shareholders will expropriate much of the minority’s
investment. Migration to the U.S. and its greater legal protections thus may
constitute a “bonding” strategy to solve this problem.
In general, the higher the regulatory costs of entry into the U.S. securities
markets are perceived to be, the more this hypothesis becomes the most satisfactory
explanation for a U.S. listing, because if increased liquidity were instead the primary
goal, it could be obtained in other international securities markets (i.e. London).
2. Network Externalities As a Justification for Mandatory Rules. If
“bonding” explains some, but not all, of the phenomenon of foreign firms migrating
to U.S. securities markets, it still does not necessarily justify subjecting the foreign
issuer to U.S. law. Arguably, this “bonding” hypothesis points toward a different
policy: namely, permitting, but not requiring, foreign issuers to subject themselves to
192

See text and notes supra at notes 124 to 127.
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U.S. securities law. Then, those firms that wished to assure minority investors that
they would comply with the higher U.S. standards could voluntarily elect to opt into
the U.S. system, while other firms could list, agreeing only to meet their home
jurisdiction’s standards.193 Given such a choice, the two populations arguably
would segregate, and potentially the shares of firms agreeing only to meet their
home country standard would trade at a price discount. On this basis, some
commentators have urged the abandonment of mandatory U.S. disclosure rules and
the adoption of essentially such a system.194
The common premise of these proposals is that the “United States has only a
weak interest in the disclosure behavior of foreign issuers, even those whose shares
are predominantly owned by U.S. investors.”195 Among these critics, some doubt
the benefit of any mandatory disclosure standards, while others believe the use of
U.S. standards for U.S. issuers benefits allocative efficiency within the U.S.
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The election to comply with “higher” U.S. standards would, however,
have to be irrevocable; otherwise, having sold shares to U.S. investors,
foreign issuers might reconsider their election and return to a “lower”
disclosure standard.

194

See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew Guzman, Portable Reciprocity:
Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 903 (1998); Merritt Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing
Market: Who Should Regulate Whom?, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2498 (1997).
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See Fox, supra note 194, at 2618.
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economy, but they still oppose their broader application to foreign issuers (even if
principally owned by U.S. investors).196
What then is the U.S. interest in requiring foreign issuers to comply with U.S.
disclosure standards once they enter the U.S. market, even though only a minority of
the affected shareholders are U.S. citizens? Perhaps, the strongest argument for
mandatory standards is that the U.S. should protect the “network externalities”
associated with its securities markets. Network externalities are a familiar
economic concept and are defined as the increasing returns to users of a product as
its total number of users grow.197 The classic example is the telephone: if the
telephone is used only by 1,000 citizens, it is a novelty; if it is used by 100,000,000,
it is a necessity. As the number of users grows and each user can reach more
persons by means of the telephone, the telephone has a higher value for all users.
Similarly, as more people came to use the automobile earlier in this century, a
supporting infrastructure developed around it: gas stations became plentiful and
roads were upgraded, making the automobile a more valuable means of
196

This is Professor Fox’s position, who doubts the case for investor
protection, but believes mandatory disclosure does improve efficient
pricing and allocative efficiency. See Fox, supra note 194.
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For a recent discussion of “network externalities” as applied to
corporate law, see Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law
and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757 (1995).
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transportation.
That there are network externalities associated with securities markets seems
self-evident. As more users come to a market, the market gains liquidity (and
predictably price spreads narrow, as dealers can quote narrower bid/asked spreads
as trading volume increases).198 Clearly, a listing becomes more valuable as more
investors come to the market. In this light, an initial “network externality” is the
advantage of complementarity. As issuers conform to common disclosure,
accounting and listing standards, investors gain the ability to compare securities in a
common language and scoring system. Inherently, investors need to compare
security A against security B, and this task becomes quicker and easier as more
issuers converge to comply with the dominant market’s accounting and disclosure
standards. In short, as any number of commentators have noted,199 harmonization of
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disclosure standards results in reduced effort and transaction costs for the
investor.200
Complementarity is, however, only an initial example. While
complementarity chiefly reduces costs for investors, the more important network
externalities that surround a securities market may be those that primarily enhance
the issuer’s ability to obtain the highest price for its securities. Obviously, the
existing listed firms in a market share a common interest that newcomers not injure
or erode the reputational capital surrounding the market that they may have created.
For example, if a foreign issuer’s management could engage in insider trading
(which would be possible if U.S. law were superceded by home country law, as
proponents of curbing the “extraterritorial” reach of the U.S. securities laws have
urged), then the existing domestic firms in the same market might be disadvantaged.
Similarly, lax accounting standards abroad might make the incoming foreign firm
200

The counterargument will predictably be made that an efficient market
can discount the legal risks associated with foreign stocks. Although
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appear more successful than the domestic firm (because of the absence of a common
disclosure standard); alternatively, domestic firms might be injured by the
uncertainty and reputational stigma that insider trading and other predatory conduct
arguably create. Nor is the injury merely reputational: if insider trading becomes
possible, dealers in the market will realize that they are trading at a disadvantage
with informed traders and will predictably increase their bid/asked spreads to
protect themselves from better informed traders.201 This point is not limited to
insider trading; rather, insider trading is but one example of conduct that increases
agency costs. To the extent that agency costs are greater under foreign law regimes,
U.S. investors are faced with an increased prospect of self-interested action by
management and other insiders, as foreign firms not subject to U.S. legal standards
increasingly enter the market.
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Another subcategory of network externalities involves the assurances that
issuers in the U.S. market receive about the conduct of their fellow issuers. For
example, a firm that today enters the U.S. market becomes subject to the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, which precludes not only bribes and “questionable
payments,” but all forms of off-book accounts and falsification of accounting
records. Thus, a foreign issuer entering the U.S. market effectively agrees not to
compete against its U.S. rivals using such means. Even if this prohibition cannot be
fully enforced, there is at the margin some reduction in the risk that U.S. issuers face
that they will be subject to illicit competition from foreign rivals. This is another
example of a network externality, because as the number of listed foreign issuers
grows, the earlier firms gain increased value from the listing of subsequent firms.
Closely related to this benefit is the benefit to earlier listed firms that they not
suffer competitive injury because of their mandatory disclosure of proprietary
information, which their competitors can then exploit. Some commentators have
argued that mandatory disclosure, as practiced in the United States, frequently
results in competitive injuries to U.S. firms.202 But, if so, requiring foreign firms to
comply with a similar standard at least levels the playing field--whereas permitting
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foreign firms to continue to disclose under a less demanding standard would
perpetuate this disparity. Once again, as foreign firms list, the earlier listed
domestic firms benefit, but only to the extent that a common disclosure standard
prevails. To be sure, this protection does not attract the foreign issuer to the U.S.
market, but it is a regulatory cost that it must bear (and from which U.S. issuers
benefit) so long as U.S. legal standards are mandatory for all listed companies.
These observations need to be generalized in terms of this article’s earlier
analysis of concentrated versus dispersed ownership patterns. Fundamentally,
blockholder systems of concentrated ownership and the Anglo-American system of
dispersed ownership represent highly inconsistent approaches to corporate
governance (even if it is arguable that they are equally efficient). Blockholder
systems attempt to achieve effective monitoring of management by offering the
blockholder the practical ability to engage in forms of self-dealing and insider
trading that are anathema to market-centered systems of dispersed ownership.203
Whatever the wisdom of this approach, the listing of the minority shares of such
blockholder-dominated companies on U.S. exchanges essentially introduces firms
that subsidize the blockholder into a population of firms that have traditionally
closely policed this same controlling shareholder relationship. The result is to marry
203
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the square peg with the round hole--unless the market-centered system’s policy of
protecting minority rights is extended to apply to blockholder-dominated companies.
In this light, the most important network externality associated with the U.S. and
U.K.’s system of market centered dispersed ownership is the sense of trust and
confidence that investors have developed over decades of experience and with
thousands of listed securities. In principle, trust grows as the number of listings on
the exchange increase (because this deepens the investors’ experiential base), but it
subject to injury if new listings will disrupt and contradict that prior experience. In
short, “high-trust” markets are injured by the introduction of “low-trust” firms.
In truth, the forces that encourage the development of trust and cooperation
may transcend purely legal forces,204 but the existence of strong legal protections
seems an excellent proxy for these forces. Indeed, where legal forces exist to
protect the minority shareholder, an institutional and cultural infrastructure-composed of such important actors as security analysts, rating agencies, and
business journalists--soon follows. Ultimately, trust is a learned behavior for
investors, and their common experience, which teaches them that trust in
management is efficient, that may be based on a composite of legal and social
204
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forces. But for precisely this reason, a market cannot simultaneously trade “high
trust” (i.e., U.S. and U.K.) Firms and “low trust” (European and Asian firms)
without the investors’ unsatisfactory experience with the latter creating skepticism
of the former. In short, some spillover is inevitable.205
A final, related consideration involves the political economy underlying
securities markets–and, more specifically, how the existing political consensus that
supports trust could quickly unravel if foreign and domestic issuers were subject to
markedly different disclosure standards. Clearly, compliance with higher U.S.
disclosure standards imposes real costs on U.S. issuers and may also at times
compel them to disclose proprietary information that they would prefer not to reveal
to their business competitors.206 Against this backdrop, assume that the SEC were
to permit foreign issuers to list in the U.S. without complying with U.S. standards.
At this point, the political reaction of domestic issuers seems obvious: why, they
would ask, should they be subject to higher costs and greater competitive injury
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when their international competitors were permitted to sell securities in the U.S.
based on a less demanding standard? In effect, permitting foreign issuers to abide
only by foreign standards concedes that investor protection concerns do not require
more. Once the SEC makes such a concession, its negotiating position vis-a-viz
domestic issuers would be seriously compromised. Hence, accepting any significant
disparity in disclosure standards for one market creates an unstable environment in
which political pressures are likely to produce regulatory arbitrage--and the
proverbial “race to the bottom.”
3. Strong Managers and Dispersed Ownership
As earlier noted, the “political” theory of corporate finance explains dispersed
ownership as largely the result of legal constraints that (in the U.S. context) impeded
the natural development of financial intermediaries; in contrast, the newer “legal
hypothesis” views dispersed ownership as the consequence of Anglo/American
law’s success in protecting minority shareholder. But the legal hypothesis is
relatively vague about just what the specific legal differences are that protect
minority investors in the Anglo/American context.
The recent history of privatization in the transitional economies of Eastern
Europe provides, however, a natural experiment that shows the instability of
dispersed ownership in a legal regime that does little to protect minority investors.
-118-

In several of these countries, shares in the newly privatized firms were broadly
distributed through a technique known as “voucher privatization” that essentially
distributed the shares gratuitously among all adult citizens.207 In the Czech
Republic, where minority protections were the weakest, dispersed ownership
proved short-lived; controlling blocks were quickly assembled and the minority
shares lost much of their value (and the trading market for such shares largely
vanished).208 This experience supports a simple generalization: the greatest danger
facing a dispersed shareholder is the “theft” of their share value incident to a rapid
assembly of a controlling block. In a non-transparent market, the dispersed
shareholder is inherently vulnerable and does not know whether to sell at the first
sign of a potential control acquisition or to hold out for a higher price.
In contrast, in the classic Berle/Means corporation, with its separation of
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ownership control, strong mangers are in a position to “protect” the dispersed
shareholders from any creeping acquisition of control that does not afford all
shareholders a roughly equal opportunity to share in the control premium. In
addition, legal rules in both the U.S. and the U.K. protect the dispersed shareholder
from the “creeping” acquisition of control without the payment of a control
premium. Perhaps more importantly, managers, themselves, have only weak
incentives to buy control (because they are already undiversified and hence should
rationally be risk averse about further investments in their firm). In addition, U.S.
law closely regulates “going private” transactions. But if management does not
want to buy the firm, they also do not want outsiders to assemble a controlling
block. To be sure, such “protection” may well result in managerial entrenchment, as
self-interested managers resist all third party offers. Still, the ultimate tradeoff is
uncertain: “strong managers” may protect dispersed shareholders from non-pro rata
attempts to “steal” the firm’s control premium, but they also may entrench
themselves, resisting even generous tender offers for all the firm’s stock. This
explanation can also provide a further reason for migration to U.S. securities
markets: firms facing the gradual dissipation of a control block (including a control
holder who wishes to sell) may prefer the U.S. market where managers can better
hope to resist the sudden formation of a new control block.
-120-

In general, a management that does not hold a controlling equity position may
be the dispersed shareholders’ principal protection against theft of the control
premium. To be sure, this protection comes at a price, but it also explains why
dispersed ownership is a stable, persistent phenomenon in the Anglo/American
context, while dispersed share ownership has proved to be only a temporary stage in
transitional economies. By insisting upon the manager’s fiduciary duty to the firm,
(a concept unknown to the civil law), Anglo/American law restricts the ability of the
firm’s management to acquire control of the firm at a price below fair value. In so
doing, common law legal regimes also gives management a strong incentive to resist
outsiders who would similarly assemble a control block. The net result is a system
of checks and balances that permits dispersed ownership to persist. In this light, the
key difference between “common law” and “civil law” legal regimes may be less
the statutory protections, than the ability given to a “strong” management to fend off
outside control seekers.
E. The Centrality of Securities Regulation
This article has said little about state corporate law, because it believes that
the critical restraints that most limit agency costs are today contained in federal
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securities laws.209 Indeed, the importance of federal securities law may so
overshadow that of state corporate law as to make the distinctions among state laws
relatively unimportant in the case of the publicly held corporation (at least with
regard to limiting agency costs).210 Interestingly, this is basically what Canadian
scholars have reported about corporate charter competition in Canada.211
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Of course, state law regulates the simplest forms of fiduciary abuse:
unfair self dealing, excess compensation, usurpation of corporate
opportunities. But these forms of misconduct rarely have a material
impact on share price. In contrast, federal law more directly regulates
corporate control transactions that could injure minority shareholders.
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The immediate significance of this assessment that federal law has
overshadowed state law variations lies principally in its implications for foreign
issuers. Even if some foreign jurisdictions do grant controlling shareholders the
discretionary power to take self-interested actions, this discretion may be
significantly constrained by federal securities regulation. In short, the much
discussed differences between the protections given by Anglo/American law versus
Continental European law may be overshadowed by the legal protections implicit
either in the U.S. securities law or in a “harmonized” international system of
securities regulation. Although these disparities in the scope of securities
regulations would be more significant than the variations among state law on
corporate duties within the United States, these disparities may also be reduced or
neutralized by the threat of both SEC and private enforcement in U.S. courts.
Is such a Pax Americana truly possible? Concededly, it is probably
premature to predict that U.S. courts will fully enforce the provisions of U.S.
securities law against foreign controlling persons of a foreign corporation. The
strain on the enforcement capacity of the SEC would be considerable in the case of

competition among the provinces has not developed).
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some norms, but not others.212 Perhaps U.S. law will never be zealously enforced in
the case of companies that simply allow some small percentage of their stock to drift
into the hands of shareholders in the United States. Still, for the truly large firm that
enters the U.S. securities markets in a major way, this entry is probably irreversible
as a practical matter, as U.S. shareholders cannot easily be expelled or squeezed out
at low cost. With such entry will predictably come a substantial degree of
functional convergence.
F. Markets Versus States: Does the Experience with State Charter
Competition: Have Relevance to the Prospect for Convergence?
Few topics have been as extensively debated in the area of corporate law as
the claim that corporate chartering competition results in a more efficient body of
corporate law.213 Proponents of the view that charter competition produces a “race
to the top” have recently argued that a competitive market for securities law should
be similarly encouraged by permitting issuers to choose the applicable jurisdiction
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whose securities laws would apply to their activities.214 But are the two contexts
truly analogous?
This article has suggested that convergence at the level of securities
regulation will outpace convergence at the level of corporate law. In essence, this is
a prediction that international events will follow the de facto outcome of the U.S.
charter competition experience. One reason for this prediction is that the forces that
have produced a dominant supplier of corporate law at the state level (i.e.,
Delaware) have even greater impact in the international area of securities regulation
and thus make it even more likely that U.S. securities markets will become the
dominant supplier of law for large publicly held corporations.
To understand this contention, it is useful to start with an obvious point that
most commentators have largely ignored: virtually all publicly held corporations are
regulated at two distinct levels: (1) their jurisdiction of incorporation, and (2) the
various jurisdictions where their securities trade. This system of dual regulation
applies not only to Delaware corporations trading on the New York Stock
Exchange, but equally to Japanese corporations trading on the London Stock
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Exchange.215
The nature of the competition at these various levels differs, however,
dramatically. Proponents of a market for corporate charters have modeled charter
competition as simply a contest between different jurisdictions offering their laws as
a product which the issuer, as consumer, chooses among in a competitive
marketplace.216 Delaware, a small state, can thus outcompete New York or
California, much larger states, if it offers a superior product. Indeed, as a small
state, Delaware can make a more credible commitment that it will not change its law
in the future adversely to the firms incorporating in Delaware because the corporate
franchise tax revenue it would thereby risk means more to it proportionately than it
would to a larger state.217 But at the level of securities regulation, the competing
jurisdictions are not simply marketing a product (i.e., legal rules); rather, they are
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also offering the issuer access to markets of varying size, which access is tied to
acceptance of the jurisdiction’s legal rules. Thus, a small jurisdiction (i.e.,
Switzerland or Delaware) cannot as easily compete on equal terms with larger
jurisdictions (i.e., the U.S. or New York) if the legal rules so offered do not carry
with them access to securities markets. In short, Delaware or Switzerland could not
become the predominant supplier of legal rules in the securities regulation context-unless the larger jurisdictions decided to relinquish their control by allowing access
to their markets based simply on issuers complying with the law of some other
jurisdiction.
Put differently, regulatory arbitrage works only to the extent that the party
regulated can freely choose the law applicable to it (typically, by reincorporating in
a less regulated jurisdiction). But, in securities regulation, it is not an attractive
option for the issuer to flee a regulated jurisdiction if the issuer thereby also flees the
principal market for its securities. For example, few issuers would willingly move
from the New York Stock Exchange to the Milan Stock Exchange in the same
manner that they might switch their jurisdiction of incorporation from New York to
Delaware.
Of course, in theory, U.S. law could provide that any foreign issuer that
complied with the disclosure rules of its home jurisdiction could sell its securities in
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the United States. Such a reciprocal system is in fact close to what the
harmonization process has essentially wrought in Europe.218 Still, little reason exists
for the U.S. effectively to surrender control over domestic trading within its borders
in such a fashion. In Europe, harmonization was a necessary step to the creation of
pan-European trading and stock markets having minimum size and scale to be
efficient. Not only is this not so in the United States, but the U.S. also lacks the
economic motive that animates Delaware to seek to attract foreign corporations:
namely, the prospect of increased corporate franchise revenues and hence reduced
state taxes on its citizens. Because U.S. tax revenues are not meaningfully affected
by foreign listings, U.S. regulators have less reason to engage in regulatory
competition.
In any event, from a bureaucratic perspective, the occasions are rare on which
a regulatory agency has voluntarily ceded control without some compelling need
that required such a surrender. The usual assumptions of political science are that
public agencies act to maximize their powers (just as private firms seek to maximize
revenues or profits). Indeed, for the last decade, the SEC has steadfastly resisted
any reciprocal prospectus system under which foreign issuers could issue securities
218
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in the U.S. based on their home country’s disclosure standards, and has instead
insisted on a harmonization that would largely replicate U.S. standards.219
Assuming then that the United States will not lightly open its markets to
foreign issuers who do not comply with U.S. disclosure standards (either current
standards or some future harmonized standards), what does this conclusion imply
for the likely course of international convergence at the securities regulation level?
Here, the data from the U.S. experience with charter competition becomes very
relevant and supports three basic generalizations.
First, the best documented finding in the empirical literature on the U.S.
corporate chartering competition is that a high degree of uniformity has emerged in
American corporate laws. One recent careful study concludes that “American
corporate law is relatively uniform across the states.”220 In essence, this is a
conclusion that competition works and that, at least among U.S. jurisdictions, path
dependent forces have not impeded that competition materially. Much the same
could happen on the securities regulation level. Even if a German corporation
cannot reincorporate outside Germany, it can certainly sell its securities outside of
219
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Germany. Thus, competition among jurisdictions and markets can develop at the
securities regulation level, and by analogy it should similarly produce a high level of
uniformity.
Second, recent commentators have argued that the U.S. market for corporate
law is imperfectly competitive, with Delaware possessing market power and
competitive advantages that other jurisdictions cannot replicate.221 When the
advantages that give Delaware market power and a dominant position are closely
examined, however, they prove to be even more present in the case of the U.S.
capital markets. For example, some argue that the key advantage possessed by
Delaware in the competition for corporate charters is that of network externalities,222
and, as earlier argued, this is also a key advantage of the U.S. securities markets.
Another factor that could confer dominance on the largest and most popular
exchange is “herding.”223 Corporations may prefer to locate in a popular jurisdiction
of incorporation for reasons that are simply based on its popularity, not the inherent
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superiority of its law. Such a “safe” decision protects the corporation’s advisers
from criticism, pleases uninformed shareholders who assume it is correct, and
produces no adverse reaction from a marketplace that cannot easily evaluate legal
differences and so prefers the consensus choice.224 But again, this point applies at
least equally to long-established capital markets that already possess substantial
reputational capital. Listing on such a market is again a “safe decision” that will not
invite criticism. Hence, migration of the largest firms to the largest marketplace
seems logical, both because of network externalities and because of the
phenomenon of low-risk herding. Other markets cannot easily compete away the
“first mover” advantages enjoyed the U.S. markets. Although other markets may be
less regulated, lesser regulation may scare potential investors to the same degree
that it attracts potential issuers. The tradeoff is indeterminate.
Finally, the U.S. experience with charter competition suggests one last
implication: once one jurisdiction becomes dominant, other jurisdictions may not
seek to compete with it on a head-to-head basis, but may instead seek to specialize
and differentiate themselves by marketing different legal products. Thus, some
commentators have suggested that, once Delaware became the dominant jurisdiction
of incorporation, other states began to specialize and focus their corporate laws on
224
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smaller, privately held firms that lacked dispersed ownership, in order to retain these
smaller firms or attract similar firms to their jurisdiction.225 Such specialization
could similarly characterize the international competition among securities markets,
as firms with concentrated ownership might seek to list only on non-U.S. markets.
Some foreign markets would specialize in serving such controlled firms, while the
U.S. markets might offer their services principally to firms with dispersed
ownership. If so, the market power of the U.S. exchange would not be seriously
challenged.
These conclusions lead to a more general hypothesis: the greater the
likelihood that the predominance of U.S. capital markets will persist (because of the
foregoing “first mover” advantages), the less that U.S. regulators need to fear
regulatory arbitrage. Foreign issuers will pay some price in increased regulation in
order to obtain the advantages of the dominant market. Commentators have
suggested that Delaware extracts exactly this advantage from its position as the
dominant jurisdiction in order to benefit local interest groups.226 At the securities
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regulation level, the SEC could correspondingly exploit the dominance of U.S.
markets to protect the dispersed shareholder–who is after all the key constituent that
the SEC has long sought to benefit.
Predictably, those who favor regulatory arbitrage and interjurisdictional
competition will reply that this position makes the SEC a “monopolist” able to
impose its rules and regulations on foreign issuers.227 At least at the level of
international securities regulation, this is demonstrably false: other strong
international competitors exist and more may soon arise. The London Stock
Exchange is the most obvious example,228 but the prospect of a pan-European
securities exchange now seems increasingly likely. Still, even in the face of
significant competition from the London Stock Exchange, foreign listings on the
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New York Stock Exchange have tripled during this decade.229 Given the evident
choice and the resulting migration to U.S. exchanges, the need to lower U.S.
standards to “meet the competition” seems non-existent.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Paradigms shift and often quickly. At the beginning of this decade, scholars
fashioned a “political” theory of corporate finance, largely to account for the
restrictions placed by U.S. law on institutional activism. With the increasing
evidence that newly privatized economies have been unable to establish viable
securities markets, another, more recent group of scholars has focused on the
dichotomy between dispersed and concentrated ownership and concluded that legal
protections for minority shareholders are the critical variable that underlies the
growth of viable securities markets. This article has suggested that, within the U.S.
context, the critical protections for the dispersed shareholder are principally found in
the federal securities laws, particularly those provisions regulating corporate control
transactions.230
Although some synthesis of these “political” and “legal” theories of dispersed
ownership is ultimately likely, the two theories diverge sharply in their predictions
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about the likelihood of corporate convergence. While the “political” theorists argue
that the forces of path dependency are unlikely to be overcome, the “legal”
hypothesis suggests that a legal regime that protects public shareholders has
important long-term competitive advantages and will attract corporate migrants.231
This article has sought to reshape this debate by emphasizing that functional
convergence can occur (and is arriving) at the level of securities regulation, even
while corporate law convergence has been largely frustrated. Some will fear and
other will applaud the prospect of “stealth” convergence, but it is already at the
doorstep.
This leads to the ultimate normative question: should we welcome or fear
convergence. The efficiency implications of convergence are fairly obvious. If, as
suggested, the U.S. system of securities regulation not only specifies a marginally
higher standard of disclosure,232 but directly seeks to reduce agency costs, two
231
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principal efficiency gains should result from this transition: (1) harmonization of
disclosure standards promises substantial savings in transaction costs and increased
comparability of issuers, with consequent gains for investors and greater access to
capital markets worldwide for issuers;233 and (2) greater legal controls on the power
of insiders and controlling shareholders that reduce agency costs should increase the
ability of large firms to sell their shares in public markets.233 Not only does this

affect the firm’s future liquidity, capital needs or operating results. See
Note, SEC Proposals to Facilitate Multinational Securities Offerings:
Disclosure Requirements in the United States and United Kingdom, 19
N.Y.U. J. Int’l. L. & Pol. 457, 459-68 (1987).
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increase the financing options of such companies, it should also lower their cost of
capital--to the benefit not only of their shareholders, but their national economies as
well.234
Beyond these efficiency arguments, there is still a larger, normative claim that
facilitating dispersed ownership would have desirable social and political
consequences. In the absence of legal protections for the minority shareholders,
investors depend on relationships, not law. The result is a system of relationshipbased investing that at its worst can be characterized as “crony capitalism.” Such
relationship-based systems may be necessary in transitional economics where the
contracting system remains at an early and primitive stage, but relationship-based
systems of governance essentially misallocate capital and result in a highly stratified
and hierarchical economic system which discourage entrepreneurs.235 Concededly,
European governance systems have never been characterized by the corruption or
legal anarchy endemic to Asia, but they have tended toward a hierarchal and
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centrally dominated structure that is a barrier to new entrants and entrepreneurship
at a time when growth in economic productivity is being driven by such actors and
forces. Encouraging equity markets to develop and encouraging dispersed
ownership may therefore imply not only efficiency gains, but a more open society,
one less dominated by banks and centralized financial intermediaries and one more
attractive to entrepreneurship. This “social hypothesis” about the consequences of
providing legal protections for minority shareholders is speculative, but it may
ultimately prove more important than the efficiency gains.
If the transition to dispersed ownership is desirable, it implies that U.S.
securities regulation should not exempt the foreign issuer who actively enters U.S.
trading markets from those forms of regulation that seek to reduce agency costs. In
addition, it suggests that current U.S. rules may need to be strengthened. Here, U.S.
law faces an important transition problem. Traditionally, U.S. securities law has
struck a compromise with the foreign issuer that lists on a U.S. exchange or
NASDAQ, requiring it to enter the periodic disclosure system of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”), but exempting it from the proxy rules and
certain other provisions of the 1934 Act.236 In time, this will become an increasingly
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strained compromise. Why, for example, should Daimler continue to be exempt
from U.S. proxy rules when possibly the majority of its beneficial shareholders are
U.S. citizens? To be sure, sensible distinctions can be drawn: foreign issuers have
also long been exempt from the “short swing” profit provisions of Section 16(b) of
the 1934 Act,237 and this exemption makes continuing sense because Section 16(b)
is a prophylactic rule that would be a trap for unwary foreign shareholders (and
probably could not be evenly enforced in the case of foreign issuers). In contrast,
the proxy rules go to the heart of corporate governance and to the purposes
underlying migration to U.S. markets as a form of bonding.
Ultimately, this article has advanced two novel claims: law matter and trust is
efficient. Protecting the expectations of the minority may be the essential
prerequisite to an effective securities market. Still, the future, as here predicted,
does not entail the inevitable triumph of the Berle and Means corporation with its
dispersed ownership and strong management. Our contemporary systems of
dispersed and concentrated ownership are like giant tectonic plates, grating against
each other. One may push the other, and even override, but where they meet, the
primary prospect is for friction. The best way to minimize that friction is to
encourage a global process of self-selection and migration. Those firms seeking to
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grow in size to a global scale are likely to elect into the “higher” governance
standards already largely observed in the United States, and such bonding should
minimize the social friction (and even unrest) that formal convergence could cause.
Ultimately, just as securities regulation has over the last thirty years
dominated substantive corporate law in the United States, so too may the law of
securities markets effectively overshadow local substantive law on a global basis, at
least in the case of the largest public corporations. History may be beginning to
repeat itself.

-140-

